

DEBATES

ON THE

DUKE OF RICHMOND'S

FORTIFICATIONS.

[PRICE TWO SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE.]

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**AN
AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT
OF THE
DEBATES
IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS,
ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, AND TUESDAY,
FEBRUARY 28, 1786,
ON THE
PROPOSED PLAN
OF
FORTIFICATIONS,**

**BY
HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF RICHMOND,**

When the SPEAKER gave the CASTING VOTE.

**WITH
A CORRECT LIST of the DIVISION:**


**AND AN
APPENDIX,
Consisting of the REPORT made to his MAJESTY by the
BOARD of LAND and SEA OFFICERS:**

**COPIES of LETTERS from LORD SIDNEY to the
DUKE of RICHMOND, &c. &c.**

**L O N D O N:
PRINTED FOR JAMES RIDGEWAY, OPPOSITE SACKVILLE-
STREET, PICCADILLY.
M DCC LXXXVI.**

*** THE Public are respectfully requested
to read the Speech of the Hon. JAMES
LUTTREL, immediately after COL. BARRE's,
it having been misplaced by an Error of the
Press.

1306:87



FORTIFICATIONS.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

February 27th, 1786.

The SPEAKER having taken the Chair,

THE Chancellor of the Exchequer, after waiting until the buzz that attended his rising had subsided, proceeded to open to the House a proposition, which he thought proper for them to adopt before they went into the Committee of Supply, in order that it might be a direction to that committee towards regulating the vote that was in the course of the evening to be required from them.—He was not surprized at the many prejudices that had gone abroad concerning the question then in contemplation, as so many false colours had been thrown upon it, both in that House and abroad; and as so much pains and industry had been used to give them force and efficacy. The system of Fortifications had been held up to publick view, as deserving the severest censures that could be thrown on any measure of Government; and there had been attempts to excite against it, the feelings, the passions, and even the most estimable prejudices of the nation. It was represented as novel in its principle, as unconstitutional in its tendency, by laying a foundation for the increase of the standing Army, and as calculated to divert into a useless or dangerous channel, those resources that ought rather to be

applied to that great foundation of our strength, of our glory, and of our characteristic superiority over the rest of the nations of Europe—our Navy.—Those were, in themselves substantial objections, and such, as if they did really apply to the case, ought to have insuperable authority; but he was come down prepared with such arguments as he flattered himself would appear to the House sufficient to overturn and answer them all; and in order that the whole scope and object of his reasoning might be the more readily and clearly understood, he would state, in the outset, the nature of his proposition, which he had so worded as to comprehend the whole of the several principles on which, in his mind, the question was to stand.—He had on a former day, suggested, that the most regular mode for debating the subject would be in the Committee of Supply, when the question would be, whether to vote the whole of the annual Ordnance Estimates, which would amount to about 300,000*l.* or to vote only 250,000*l.* and by that means prevent the application of the fifty thousand pounds, that had been voted in a former Session, for the purpose of Fortifications, from the object for which it had been intended, by obliging the Board of Ordnance to apply it to the current service of the year; and by so doing, put an effectual stop to the whole system. From many things, however, that had fallen from Gentlemen on the other side of the House, he was induced to wish, that a different method of arguing the question should be adopted; and he accordingly devised the present mode as best calculated in his opinion, to afford an opportunity of discussing in their fullest extent, every principle that could possibly be involved in the proceeding, as well those in opposition to it as those in its favour.—It was also more consistent with the great importance of the subject to bring it immediately before the House, in the form of a specific resolution, recognizing a great and momentous principle, and founding on that principle, an instruction to the Committee, than to send it to the Committee at once, as it were incidentally and collaterally. Here he read the Resolution that he proposed, before he sat down, to move to the House.

“ That it appears to this House, that to provide effectually for securing his Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth
“ month

at mouth and Plymouth, by a permanent system of fortifications, founded on the most economical principles, and requiring the smallest number of troops possible to answer the purpose of such security, is an essential object for the safety of the State, intimately connected with the general defence of the Kingdom, and necessary for enabling the fleet to act with full vigour and effect, for the protection of commerce, the support of our distant possessions, and the prosecution of offensive operations in any war in which the nation may hereafter be engaged."

He considered this question as part of that great system that ought in the highest degree to engross the attention of Administration, and to which, that House ought to be peculiarly attentive—the national defence. And in order to judge of its necessity, towards that great object, he brought back, with much pain, as he said, the recollection of the House to the unfortunate and calamitous situation, to which we were exposed in the late war, in a great measure owing to our want of those Fortifications, which it was the aim of the present question to provide. A considerable part of our fleet was confined to our ports, in order to protect our Dock Yards, and by that means we were obliged to do what Great Britain had never done before—carry on a mere defensive war; a war in which, as in every other war merely defensive, we were under the necessity of wasting our resources, and impairing our strength, without any prospect of benefiting ourselves but at the loss of a great and valuable part of our possessions, and which at last was terminated by a necessary peace.—He drew a melancholy picture of the situation to which we were reduced by the American war, and called upon the House to answer, Were they ready to stand responsible to posterity for a repetition of such disgraces and misfortunes? Were they willing to take upon themselves the hazard of transmitting to the next generation, those dangers and those consequent calamities which they had themselves so bitterly experienced?—The subject of Fortifications was not now for the first time to be discussed; it had been before the House in the course of the last Session, and from what passed then, together with what had been done in consequence of it, he thought there was very little room, compatible

patible with consistency of conduct, for that opposition that he apprehended was intended to be given to the measure at present. The House, in the last Session had seemed well aware, that such an enquiry as was necessary towards forming a proper judgment on the subject, was by no means a proper one for it to go into. It had been on all hands agreed, that it was in a great measure a question of confidence, and they had therefore acquiesced in his proposal of sending it to the arbitration of a Board of Land and Sea Officers, to be constituted for that express purpose.—That Board had of course been appointed, and consisted of every thing that was great and respectable in the two professions; they had given the subject a greater degree of consideration and research than had ever been known on such an occasion in any other age or country. The Report made by that Board was in itself so direct, and so conclusive, as to the necessity of the measure, as ought in itself completely to determine the question, should it even appear that the reasons of a collateral nature advanced in opposition to it were entitled to the authority which some persons seemed inclined to give them. He explained the general scope of the questions that had been referred to the Board—"Whether the Dock Yards could properly and effectually be defended by a Naval force alone, by a Military force, or by a Naval and Military force combined? or whether it was necessary that Fortifications should be erected for their defence? and if so, what sort of Fortifications were likely to be most effectual?" To this they had Reported that neither a Naval or a Military force, nor even both united, could afford a sufficient security for the nation to rely on; but that Fortifications were absolutely necessary, and that of all modes of Fortifications, that suggested by the Master General of the Ordnance was the most eligible, as being the most adequate to the defence proposed, capable of being manned by the smallest force, requiring the least expence to erect, and particularly as affording an encreasing degree of security, as they were erected, inasmuch as that if any given portion of them were completed, and the remainder unfinished, yet even that part that was so completed would afford a great degree of strength. He expatiated widely on the characters and abilities of the Officers who composed that Board, and contended that it would be the highest

highest degree of inconsistency for the House, after having referred the various branches of the detail of the enquiry to a Board of Officers to reassume that duty which they had already declined as being out of their reach, and attempt to revise and correct the report of the Board.—All that the House ought to attend to was the general result of the report of that Board; for it was itself incapable of investigating the subject minutely, and by detail, much less was it capable of correcting or deciding on the Report of the Officers.—In order to diminish the credit of the Report, for the credit of the persons who framed it, could not be impeached.—It had been attempted to be shewn, that the instructions given to the Board of Officers were such as confined them to the necessity of coming to one certain result, by means of *data* proposed for their consideration, which were all merely hypothetical, and afforded no latitude to them to exercise their own judgment. But how was it possible this could have been the case, when to the two first *data* the whole Board were unanimous in giving their opinion, and their opinion on those *data* were entirely conclusive on the whole of the subject, for they went, and that (he again observed unanimously) to establish the necessity of Fortifications.—Was it, he asked, to be believed, that a Board, consisting of such men, could possibly be duped by chimerical and absurd hypotheses, so absurd and so extravagant, that he recollected the Hon. General had stated them as tantamount to a *convulsion of nature*? Was it to be supposed they could be so easily misled and drawn unanimously into an opinion on a subject of such magnitude, and contrary to their own conviction?—But in fact it was impossible to impute any such delusion in the present instance, for the answer to the first *data* was absolutely unqualified, and positive, and recognized the necessity of fortifying the Dock Yards; the second enforced the same necessity, it was true, with a proviso;—but of what? the expence of their erection and our ability to furnish a force to man them.—He farther observed, on the injustice of arguing, that the whole result of the Report was founded on *data* in themselves, improbable and ill-grounded, when, in truth, the principle *data* by which the several parts of the Report was governed, were not the original *data* referred to the Board, but such as they thought

thought necessary to substitute and adopt, as a foundation for their ultimate opinions. This idea, he said, was in itself so absurd, that the very words in which it had been expressed, and which he had before repeated, appeared as if the Gentleman that had used them were in collusion with the House, and endeavouring to put their own opposition into the most ridiculous point of view. He should think it an insult to the Officers concerned in the Report, if he thought of saying any thing more in answer to a suggestion so much to their dishonour, as that they had been so egregiously, and so palpably duped and deceived by an artifice so shallow and easily detected. Some reliance had been made in former conversations on the dissent of certain Members of the Board, with respect to their opinion, on particular parts of the subject. The instances of dissent, however, were not many, and they were such as he flattered himself could not stand as an insuperable objection to the general result. He felt himself rather in a disagreeable situation, at being obliged, in arguing the subject before the House, to attack the opinion and authority of any individual Member of the Board; but with respect to one of the two very respectable Land Officers [General Burgoyne], who had in any instance dissented from the rest, his uneasiness was the less poignant, because the Hon. General was on the spot to explain and support his own judgment; though even still he felt for the Hon. General, who, he knew, would not think himself at liberty to enter so deeply into several of the more delicate parts of the question, as perhaps, were his own justification alone concerned, he might wish to do.—But with respect to the other Officer [Lord Percy], his feelings were more distressing, because he was obliged to canvass his opinion in his absence. Those two Officers had joined with the rest of the Board in their two first unanimous opinions, with respect to the necessity of Fortifications towards the defence of the Dock Yards; but they afterwards, by a subsequent proposition, declared, that notwithstanding such necessity, yet they were useless, because we were not masters of a sufficient military force to man them. He begged the House for a moment to consider the conclusion that would follow from such premises, if nothing but certain Fortifications could possibly

possibly afford protection to our Dock Yards, and if we were unable to garrison those Fortifications when erected, what must be the consequence? Deplorable indeed! and lamentable in the extreme. It must be, that we were unable to protect them at all. The nation, however, need not despond at the prospect thus unintentionally, he was convinced, held out to them by the noble Earl, for whose character he had the highest veneration, and whose noble disinterestedness, together with the brilliant example he set to the nobility of the age, in the active service of his country, and the uniform tenor of his conduct, were sufficient to add lustre, even to the rank which Lord Percy already filled. They need not despond at this uncomfortable prospect, for the papers that had been laid upon the table, in consequence of the motions made by the enemies of the measure, clearly proved, that we should by no means stand in need of a greater force for the purpose of defending those Fortifications, than we could easily afford to that service. It would appear from one of those papers, that in the year 1779, we had about 53,000 men in South Britain, who were constantly and uniformly increasing, until the year 1782, to upwards of 71,000. There was also another paper on the table that had been demanded by the Gentlemen on the other side, which gave an account of different cantonments in which those troops had been stationed during that period; a paper which he could not think in any way material for the government of the present question, unless the Right Hon. Gentleman opposite was ready to undertake to prove, that, like all the other arrangements made in the course of the American war, the disposition of the army through England was the very best and wisest that could be devised. It appeared, however, from this paper, that the number of troops stationed in such cantonments, as might be considered within reach of Portsmouth and Plymouth, was in 1779 above 16,000 men, and that it had in the year 1782 amounted by a progressive increase to 21,500 in each case, including that most invaluable resource of national defence, the Militia. Let Gentlemen judge from this state of our military force, whether it would, in case of an invasion, be a difficult matter to furnish a sufficient garrison for the proposed works. But when it was to be considered, that our forces in Great Britain

Britain bore scarce any proportion to those which we were obliged to distribute through our then extensive dominions, and that from our present situation it was not likely any such distraction of our military power would ever again take place, it might be looked upon as indisputable and certain, that we should at all times be able to command a force fully adequate to the maintenance of the Fortifications, without in any degree derogating from the respectable defence of all our other dominions. On this part of the subject, some Gentlemen had thought proper to throw into derision and ridicule the whole enquiry of the Board of Officers, as if they had proceeded to investigate the question of Fortifications, without having any state of the probable means of supplying those Fortifications with troops for their defence laid before them. But he would only desire the House to turn over the names of the Land Officers who sat at the Board, and then to say, whether there was any foundation for such a reflection.—Was the Duke of Richmond!—Was Sir Guy Carleton!—Was Sir William Howe!—Was Sir George Lenox, who commanded at one of those places!—Was Lord Cornwallis, his respect for whom he should extenuate if he should attempt to express!—Was Sir David Lindsay, who commanded in another of those places!—Was Sir Charles Grey, who commanded in a third, and who besides, served in the course of the war with the greatest brilliancy, in the remotest parts of the globe!—Was General Roy, who at the time was Quarter-Master-General to the whole!—Were all those Gentlemen to be supposed ignorant of the general military strength of the kingdom? Or was it to be contended, that, to enable them to form an opinion on so broad and extended a question, it was necessary that the returns of every regiment should have been laid before them? Surely Gentlemen would not persist in such weak and unfounded arguments!—There was, besides, in the Report, another instance of disagreement in opinion, that, however, he thought would be found not very difficult to prove, ought not, nor could not be of any very great weight; not from the person from whom the dissent came being at all deficient in authority and consideration, but from a circumstance standing on the face of the Report itself. The name of Captain Macbride appeared to a dissent to the answer

answer given by the Board to the third *datum*. It was to be observed, that this *datum*, together with its answer, was omitted in the Report, as containing matter not safe or prudent to be made public. This consideration rendered it impossible for him, consistent with his duty, to attempt to examine it in detail, and to combat the opinion of the Hon. Officer upon its own ground; but yet he had a stronger argument than any other he could be master of, and that was, the opinion of the Hon. Officer himself, who had, six weeks before, as appeared from the minutes of the Board, given, together with all the other Members of the Board, his opinion directly in favour of the principle which that *datum* was calculated to establish. If he was mistaking the Hon. Officer, he begged to be set right; but he believed it would be evident to any Gentleman that would look at the Report, that he was perfectly correct.

Captain Macbride rose, and admitted that the Right Hon. Gentleman had correctly stated what he had said on a former day. He, however, must adhere to his former assertion, that the opinion of the Naval Officers was fully in the teeth of the Fortifications proposed at Plymouth; this, Captain Macbride said, he had Admiral Barrington's authority to cite, whom he had seen and talked the subject over with on Sunday and that forenoon. The fact was, the Naval Officers were not permitted to have an opinion of their own manifested.

After Captain Macbride sat down,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* again rose, and proceeded. He said, that as he had invited any Gentleman to correct him if he was wrong in his statement, it could not be supposed he could be hurt at the Gentleman whom he was particularly alluding to, rising to corroborate, instead of to contradict his representation. The Hon. Officer, then, had formerly united with the rest of the Board in an unanimous vote upon the subject of the third *datum*, and had afterwards, after an interval of six weeks, retracted that vote, and entered another on the minutes of the Board diametrically opposite to it—thus each opinion had the authority of the name of Captain Macbride; and if any dilemma was to arise in forming a judgment between them both, it was easily solved by referring to the Report itself, in which it would appear, that, though each

each opinion was equally supported by the Hon. Officer, yet the casting voice between Captain Macbride's first and second opinion was given by the whole Board, with which he acted, in favour of his former one, and of course there could be no room for the House to hesitate a moment which of the two they ought to adopt. There was another circumstance which he thought necessary to state under the head of the dissents, from the general purport of the Report, that he might answer it in order; although it did not arise out of the Report itself, but had been taken up in that House for the first time by the Hon. Officer, when he stated, that the Fortifications proposed to be erected on the lands adjacent to Whitesand Bay, were directly in the teeth of the opinion of all the Sea Officers. He begged the House to attend particularly to the two distinct branches into which that part of the question was divided; one of a Naval, the other of a Military consideration. That which more immediately demanded the judgment of the naval service was, the practicability of the enemy effecting a landing at all upon the coast, together with the various circumstances of tides, winds, soundings, currents, and anchorage that might be necessary, and the probability there was of all those concurring, so as to enable an enemy to land at all, and to remain long enough off the coast to cover and complete their debarkation; the other subject was for the discussion of the Land Officers singly, and had for its object the most effectual method of so fortifying the coast, as to prevent the enemy, should they effect a landing, from penetrating the country. The opinion of the Sea Officers was, that in certain circumstances it was possible for an enemy to land; and he could only account for the objection of the Hon. Officer against fortifying a coast on which an enemy might (as it was admitted) land, by that gallant spirit and bravery which would at all times induce him to turn his thoughts more to the animating and brilliant prospect of attacking his enemy, than the less glorious, but still prudent duty, of providing for his own defence. But in furnishing the part of the country in question with forts, they ought not to confine themselves solely to the idea of an enemy's landing in Whitesand Bay. They should consider whether it would be practicable for him to land in any place to the west of
Plymouth;

Plymouth; for if she could do so, then were these forts absolutely necessary for the defence of that town and its Dock Yards; they were the very posts which an enemy would most eagerly endeavour to occupy, because from them they would be able to bombard the Dock Yards. Every man that knew our coasts, and those who, to their own honour, and the glory of their country, were acquainted with those of our enemies, knew also that it was absurd to think of fortifying every part of them that could afford a landing-place for the purpose of an invasion. The consideration was, where would an invasion be most detrimental, and there fortify; fortify in such a manner, that not only an invasion by sea should not be practicable, but that if an enemy should have been able to land in another place, he might not also be able successfully to attack them there. He hoped he might hear no more of Whitesand Bay, for it was not the defence of that Bay, it was the defence of the Dock Yards of Plymouth that was intended; it was not a landing there alone that was to be prevented; it was a landing on any part of the coast that was to be defeated, at least as far as it had an attack on Plymouth for its object; and if Whitesand Bay were surrounded by a wall of adamant, still Plymouth could not be safe, until those grounds were fortified. He hoped, and believed, he had completely done away the whole force of the dissents of the several Officers to whom he had alluded; and then proceeded to answer objections of another nature that had been made. It had been thrown out, and the Gentlemen seemed much inclined to build upon it, that the whole system of Fortifications was new and unprecedented in this country; this idea he was prepared to combat in the most direct and positive manner. The system of Fortifications did always make a part of the general defence of England, and he would prove it by the most incontestible records of history. He went back as far as the reign of King Henry the Eighth, observing, that there was a provision made by statute at that early period, for fortifying certain parts of the coasts. The statute he would not take upon himself to read, because the terms in which it was couched were become obsolete, and almost unintelligible. The same policy was observed by Queen Elizabeth, and formed a considerable part of the defence provided by

that great and glorious Piratical against the expected attack of the Armada. In the less prosperous reigns of the Stuart Princes the same system was occasionally continued, and again adopted by our illustrious deliverer, William the Third. In the reign of Queen Anne, at the time when the victories of the British arms were forming an era in the history of Europe, at which England looked back with pride, and other nations with amazement. Did our ancestors then think it incompatible with their glory, with their liberty or their constitution, to fortify the most vulnerable parts of their coasts, as it was now proposed to do?—No, he said, there was a Resolution of the Commons not even at the desire of the Crown, laying down the necessity of fortifying the Dock-Yards against any possible invasion, and those resolutions were founded upon estimates of plans that had been made under the reign of King William. The estimates of those Fortifications amounted to a sum which, considering the difference between those times, and the expensive times in which it was our misfortune to live, gave no great room for a charge of prodigality against those who had digested the present plan. The money then voted was 300,000*l.* which, when compared with the value of money at this day, would appear to be no very trifling sum. To come down to a later period, a period to which it might be supposed he was somewhat partial—the last war, (here Mr. Pitt corrected himself) the *last* war! would to God, he said, we could call it the *last* war—Not, indeed the last war, but the last on which Britons could reflect without a sigh or a blush—the war of contrast with the last! the war in which the name of Britain was exalted above the highest and the proudest of nations; by successes as stupendous, and conquests as glorious as our late miscarriages and defeats had been calamitous and disgraceful. What he asked was the policy of the Administration of that day? That it was exactly similar with what was now recommended he would prove by one or two short extracts from the Statute Book.—The first was from an Act of 12*th* Geo. II. for providing Fortifications for the Dock-Yards, and the second was for a Fortification for some more insignificant place (Milford as well as he could remember) in which the very grounds of the policy

now

now inculcated and recognized—that by procuring adequate means for domestic defence, the nation would be more at liberty to send its fleets abroad either for the purpose of defending her foreign settlements, or carrying on the operations of offensive hostility into the centre of the enemy's possessions.—Thus it might be seen, that in the very best days of this country, the system of Fortifications, was uniformly practised and encouraged; but even in a later period, during [the Administration of the Right Hon. Gentleman, opposite to him, the very identical plan of Fortifications then under discussion had been considered, and an estimate for carrying them into execution had been presented to that House. He supposed the Right Hon. Gentleman who so lately contended for the propriety of Ministers being always ready to make up their minds on every subject that related to the force of the country, and who had himself, it appeared, made up his mind on the subject, was now ready to give his reasons, for that change of opinion, it was to be feared, he intended on the present occasion to avow. For his own part, notwithstanding the great abilities and uncommon versatility of talents which the Right Hon. Gentleman was well known to possess, he was apprehensive that he would not be able to reconcile to any principles of consistency, his practice of making up his mind when in Administration, and unmaking it with so much facility when out of office. He should, however, expect to hear that particular circumstance fully explained, as far as so extraordinary a change of opinion in such a peculiar variety of circumstances could admit of explanation. As to the necessity that had been suggested, would be created by this measure of augmenting the standing army, nothing could be more void of foundation. It had been unanimously reported by the Board of Officers, that the plan of Fortifications proposed, was the best calculated for the defence of the Dock Yards of any other that could be devised, and that it was such as was capable of defence by the smallest number of troops. Would any person then contend, that a smaller number of troops, independent of Fortifications, were able to defend a place better than a large body assisted with the best possible Fortifications? Such an idea was too absurd to be argued against; and yet, in fact, it was the

the only idea, on which that topic of opposition could possibly be maintained. Should we, in case of an invasion trust solely to our standing army, then indeed there would be a necessity of augmenting to a most enormous degree that army on which the whole safety of the kingdom was to rest. Was this the way to vindicate and secure our liberties? If we did not keep up such an army, then we should be reduced to the necessity of recurring to foreign assistance; perhaps to the protection of mercenaries bribed by our money, and who, when we had no longer occasion for their service, would be as ready to turn their arms against ourselves; was it less desirable for us to be defended by the walls of Portsmouth and Plymouth, garrisoned by our own militia, than to purchase the protection of Hessian hirelings? The plan had been objected to on the ground of the expence which would attend it, and of the probability that we could not expect to be free from a war until it should be completed, and that we should derive no advantage from them at the time of the greatest necessity. As to the latter of these objections, he requested the House to recollect the words of the Report on the table, from which they would learn that the plan of Fortification proposed to be adopted was one calculated even in an unfinished and imperfect state to afford great means of defence; and that every part of them, tho' wanting all other assistance, and standing singly by itself, would be highly useful and desirable. Thus every part would be answerable to the great object, and so far from rendering it necessary for the House to hold itself committed to a constant and periodical expence until the whole was completed, the fact would be, that every year the necessity of adding to the fortifications would diminish, because every year the Dock-yards would receive additional strength.—As to the expence attending the building of the works, he flattered himself that his sentiments and ideas on the subject of the finances of the country, was no very backward feature in his political character.—He hoped he had not shewn himself remiss in any endeavours that could possibly tend to raise the Revenue from that deplorable state to which it was reduced by the melancholy process to the late lamented war. It was too well known how much his feelings were engaged, not only by the duty of his station, and by his attachment to his country,

(but

But by considerations of his own personal reputation, which was deeply committed in the question, to exert every nerve to arm all his vigilance, and to concentrate all his efforts towards that great object by which alone we should have a prospect, by relieving their burthens, of transmitting to our posterity that ease and comfort which ourselves felt the want of an efficient sinking fund of the gradual discharge of the national debt, to accomplish, this was the first wish of his heart; and this, as well by every means of prudent well regulated oeconomy, as by a rigid collection of the Revenue. But was he to be seduced by the plausible and popular name of oeconomy—he would not call it only plausible and popular, he would say the *sacred* name of oeconomy, to forego the reality, and for the sake of adding a few hundred thousands more to the Sinking Fund, perhaps render for ever abortive the Sinking Fund itself. Every saving that could, consistent with the national safety, be made, he would pledge himself should be made; but he would never consent to starve the publick service, and to withhold those supplies, without which the nation must be endangered. The relieving by every such means as his duty would suffer him to adopt, the burthens of the people, and removing that load of debt, by which she was oppressed, was the grand and ultimate object of his desire, it was the pedestal to which he would wish to raise a column that should support whatever pretensions he might have to reputation and popularity; but let it be well considered, how far the objects of necessary defence, and of publick oeconomy could be reconciled, and let the bounds that divide them not be transgressed. He begged they would well weigh what a certain security for a lasting peace there was in a defensible and powerful situation, and how likely weakness and improvidence were to be the forerunners of war. Should a war happen where was oeconomy? What was to become of the Sinking Fund? The very expences of one year's loan would amount to more than the whole of those fortifications that might have insured us peace, because they would have diminished or effectually have destroyed all temptation or hope of success in an attack. In this point of view, as the means of preventing a war he looked upon it, that the first million that should be applied as the foundation for the Sinking Fund, would not be better applied

plied than a million of money for the Fortifications; not
 that a million would be necessary, but he chose to state it
 as high as any other Gentleman, let his talents of exag-
 geration be what they might, could possibly do. But there
 was another part of the subject that ought to have the
 greatest weight of all; which was, that these Fortifica-
 tions being calculated to afford complete security to the
 Dock-Yards, would enable our whole fleet to go on in-
 remote services, and carry on the operations of war at a
 distance without endangering the materials and seeds of
 future navies from being liable to destruction by the in-
 vasion of an enemy. It had been insinuated that the *second*
detail in his Majesty's instructions had been used to draw
 forth an acquiescence from the Board of Officers on an
 unreasonable supposition of the fleet being absent for a
 certain improbable time. He believed there were few
 gentlemen could forget, that, at no very distant period,
 even since he had the honour of a place in his Majesty's
 Councils, the fleet had been absent for a time nearly equal
 to that supposed in the *detail*, on a service which this
 country could not have dispensed with without sacrificing
 the most brilliant success that attended us in the late war,
 a success of such lustre and glory as to spread an irradiation
 over the other more gloomy scenes in which we had been
 involved. Had we been then in fear of an attack upon
 our coasts, which from reasons not proper to be men-
 tioned, we happened not to be, Gibraltar, and the remove
 of defending it, must have been lost for ever. But it was
 not only by foreign expeditions that we might lose the aid
 of our fleet in case of an invasion; it might so happen,
 that our fleet, though in the Channel, might be prevented
 by winds, tides, or other contingencies, from coming to
 the assistance and relief of the Dock-Yards. What would
 then be the situation of this country? The enemy might
 in one day, in one hour, do an irreparable injury, and
 give a mortal stab to the very vital principle of our
 national strength and vigour, might, essentially de-
 stroy the funds of that Navy, from which alone we
 were to hope for commerce, safety, and our reputation.
 — On the whole, he really thought the present sta-
 tion of a question to be considered as connected with our
 naval establishment, than that of our Armies or Ordnance,
 as it was calculated to give liberty to the fleet that had
 hitherto

hitherto been confined to our coasts, chained down as it were to the defence of those Dock Yards, without the security of which the very existence of the Navy, or even of the nation must be no more. It might be asked, why the sum that was required for those Fortifications had not been demanded for strengthening the Navy, and he should answer fairly; that he thought the same sum laid out upon the fleet, would by no means afford a proportional strength to what would be derived from the Fortifications. The money that would be sufficient to accomplish those works, would not build as many ships as would be sufficient for the defence of the two invaluable harbours of Portsmouth and Plymouth—There was, besides a certain degree beyond which the Navy of this country could not go; there was a certain number of ships, beyond which she could neither build nor man any more. What that line was he could not, nor would it be proper for him to point out, there necessarily must be such in the nature of things—but there never could be any line drawn to limit the degree of security we ought to provide for our Dock Yards. What could be the reason that Gentlemen on the other side of the House seemed so anxious to impede this measure? Were they bold enough to stake themselves upon a question of such awful magnitude, and to stand forward with such decided vehemence as the opponents of a measure, that Parliament thinking itself incompetent to scrutinize, had referred to the highest professional authority in the Army and the Navy—that had received the sanction of that authority, and which the Ministers of the Crown who could have no personal feelings on the subject, (except such as from considerations of their own ease and advantage, were adverse to it) and who could have no temptations towards it, but a strong sense of its indispensable necessity, declared themselves so much interested about, as to be unable to rest upon their pillows as long as it remained in suspense. He called upon the House to beware how they suffered themselves to be lightly drawn into a line of conduct that might involve their posterity, nay themselves, for if they continued in their present weak state they might accelerate the danger, in the heaviest calamities. He asked them if, a few years ago, when the Fleets of the enemy were hovering over Plymouth, they felt themselves in-

clined with arms across, and that listless security they now seemed to indulge in, to debate the question of Fortifying the Dock Yards. He was happy in reflecting upon the great abilities, the high rank, and the reputation and virtue of the Right Hon. Gentleman, because having so much at stake he would be the less apt to insist on an opposition pregnant with so much mischief as the present, and because the remorse they must otherwise feel, if they should hereafter find that they had involved their country in the most dreadful calamities on grounds less important and consequential than the sanction of the Right Hon. Gentleman.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* was on his legs full two hours and twenty minutes, during which time he urged a great variety of arguments to prove, that the proposed system of Fortifying the Dock Yards was absolutely necessary for the preservation and security of the sources of our marine in case of a future war, and that the system in question, had received the unanimous sanction of a Board of Land and Sea Officers, consisting of the most respectable and experienced characters in the two services, and that they had in their Report pronounced the plan the best adapted to its purpose, of any that could be devised, grounded on the most economical principles, and requiring the smallest number of troops to man. Viewing it properly, it was, he asserted a *Naval* question, and as such it ought to be considered, because while it gave security to the vital springs and sources of our Marine, so far from rendering an increase of the Military force of the Kingdom necessary, as some Gentlemen from a laudable jealousy of the standing Army, and from a natural and zealous regard for the Constitution, had been led to imagine, it would actually tend to enable Government to keep up a less Military establishment, than otherwise must be maintained. This position he laboured to make out, resting his hopes of support solely on the power of his arguments to prove what he had asserted in that respect. He concluded his speech with reading the words of two preliminary Resolutions, which would be declaratory of the opinion of the House upon the subject (should they think fit to adopt them) and which, by being voted previous to their going into the Committee of Supply, would lay a foundation for their future proceedings, and rest their
votes

votes in the Committee on a perspicuous and permanent footing. He concluded with moving his first Resolution as follows:

“ That it appears to this House, that to provide effectually for securing his Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth, by a permanent system of Fortifications, founded on the most economical principles, and requiring the smallest number of troops possible to answer the purpose of such security, is an essential object for the safety of the State, ultimately connected with the general defence of the Kingdom, and necessarily for enabling the Fleet to act with full vigour and effect, for the protection of Commerce, the support of our distant possessions, and the prosecution of offensive operations in any War in which the Nation may hereafter be engaged.”

Mr. *Bastard* rose to renew his resistance to any farther pursuit of a system, which he considered as ruinous to the interests of his country, and of which he was proud to avow himself to have been its first opposer. He gave the Minister credit for having last session consented that the matter should be referred to a Board of Enquiry, constituted of Naval and Land Officers of the first rank and character, but reprobated the manner in which that Board had been managed, declaring that three of the most skilful and experienced of its nominated members, Lord Townsend, General Conway, and Lord Amherst, had been excluded from taking their seats at it, in consequence of a paltry manœuvre played off by the noble Duke at the head of the Ordnance, who had procured himself to be appointed President of the Board. He expatiated on this procedure, and asked where was the boasted fairness and impartiality of the reference, when such a manœuvre was practised, as it was well known that officers of long standing could not sit at the Board at which a junior officer presided? He ridiculed the reasoning of the Noble Duke, and said he had never heard but of one engineer, who was fond of Fortifications, and founded them upon the same principles as the Noble Duke was so partial to; the *data*, that met the eye so frequently in the printed extracts from the Report; the Engineer he alluded to was the renowned Don Quixote de la Mancha. Don Quixote always called for *data*, and proceeded to build his Fortifications on those grounds;

grounds; the Noble Duke's Fortifications appeared full as Quixotic. He reminded the House that the nation had ever been jealous of every thing that looked like an increase of the standing army, and asked whether one great argument in defence of the Militia, and what greatly recommended the institution to Englishmen had not been the circumstance of their mixing so much with the people in their houses, and whether that did not tend to preserve to them their characters of citizens, rather than to hold them out as soldiers. The Militia had been called the School of the Army; if that description was true, would it not be more justified by shutting them up in fortresses, and keeping them separate from their fellow subjects. Might not those strongholds be termed seminaries for soldiers, and universities for Prætorian Bands? and was it not likely that the Militia would come out of garrison with minds rather prepared for joining the regular army, than inclined to return to mix with their countrymen employed in civil avocations? Mr. Bastard enlarged on this idea, and pressed it home to the hearts of all who heard him, urging the unconstitutional tendency of the proposed system; and at the same time assuring the Minister, that it was so much the object of odium and detestation in the county, which he had the honour to represent, that if the Fortifications, that were intended to be raised there, should be erected, the People, on whom it appeared a reliance was placed for assistance in manning them in case of necessity, would refuse to lend any sort of help whatever.

Mr. Bastard said, he saw the aim was to abandon that mode of defence, that the wisdom of our ancestors had prompted them to adopt, and which stood established as the most politic for our island to adhere to, by the sanction of centuries. He for one could not repress his indignation at the idea of tearing the ensign of the British glory from the mast head, and fixing it to a standard on the ramparts of a military garrison. Before he sat down, he assured the Right Hon. Gentleman, that the sense of the country was clearly and decidedly against the system, as he would see from the description of Gentlemen who would take share in the opposition of the day. Neither those he alluded to, nor he himself, acted from
party

party motives, or with a view to factious purposes. They stood up the advocates of their country, in a moment that seemed to threaten it with most serious danger, from the adoption of a system, as absurd as impolitic; but they stood up independent men, unconnected with any party, and as ready to support the Minister when he appeared to be in the right, as determined firmly to oppose him, when they were satisfied he was in the wrong. After a variety of cogent arguments, urged with ability and force, it was moved to leave out from the word *House* to the end of the Question, in order to insert, *That Fortifications on so extensive a plan, as proposed by the Board are inexpedient.*

Sir William Lemon rose to second the Amendment. Sir William in a neat and well turned speech, supported Mr. Bastard's arguments. He began with complimenting that Gentleman on his public spirit evinced in his having manfully stood up from the first mention of it, the uniform opposer of a system, which as it tended to introduce a departure from the old mode of defending the Island by a naval force, could not but give alarm to every well-wisher to his country. He enlarged on this idea, and took notice how ill-timed it was to recommend a plan of Fortifications to the House, when it had not been ascertained whether that constitutional force, the Militia, was to be called out annually or not. This added to the appearance of a design of abandoning the cultivation of our marine, and relying rather on the army and military erections for security, must, he said, create much jealousy, in that House, as well as without doors, in consequence of the unconstitutional tendency of such conduct. Sir William after stating that if the proposed system of Fortification was adopted, that might be considered as the fatal æra, from whence the decline and ruin of our Navy might be dated, said, he meant not to impute any bad design to the present Administration in recommending the plan proposed, nor to hint a suspicion of the friendly inclination of the Prince on the throne to the liberties of his people; but long experience had proved, that when every thing wore the appearance of security, and the country had a thorough confidence in the King and his servants, more than ordinary caution ought to be exercised by the people, whom it then be-
came

came less than ever to be ready to allow a system to be adopted, that in the hands of a weak Prince, and wicked Ministers, might become a formidable engine of prerogative, and be turned against their freedom and against the constitution. Sir William admonished the Minister, and cautioned him against pursuing steps that would lead him astray from the favour, and strip him of the confidence of the people. He concluded with giving his hearty assent to the amendment.

Mr. Wallwyn spoke also on the same side, and in a short and fluent speech recommended it to the Right Hon. Gentleman to drop the idea of persisting in a plan against which the public in general were extremely averse. Mr. Wallwyn declared, that report confidently said, the Right Hon. Gentleman's mind was not with the system, and that he was by no means a sincere friend to it. [The Chancellor of the Exchequer, with some warmth, complained of the injustice of such an imputation, declaring the Report to be most grossly false and wholly groundless.] Mr. Wallwyn said, he spoke of it merely as a report, and he had hoped the report was true. He said, *to be or not to be*, a powerful maritime state, appeared to him to be *the question*. Till the Right Hon. Gentleman could urge some argument that amounted to a solution of the problem he had started, viz. that the proposed system of Fortification, which must necessarily require a number of men to garrison, would nevertheless be a means of diminishing the *quantum* of standing army, requisite for the defence of the kingdom, he should think it his duty to oppose the system as directly militating against the ancient mode of insular defence, as prejudicial to the increase of our Navy, and as dangerous to the constitution. And concluded by giving his hearty support to the amendment.

General Burgoyne rose, and declared, he felt himself extremely embarrassed between what he ought to divulge, and what he knew; between the *data* that were in the extracts from the Report, and those that were not there; but he would endeavour to explain his sentiments on the subject. He then gave an account of the conduct of the noble Duke at the Board of Enquiry, declaring, that when the Members of it assembled, the noble Duke gave them

them his plan with the *data* to consider, and called for their plans in return. He commented on this mode of proceeding, and asked what individual, even if he had prepared a plan, would have chosen to commit himself with it in that manner, against a plan produced by the President of the Board, after its having been under his consideration and improvement for two years. They were therefore reduced to the necessity of giving their replies to the *data* such as they were, leaving the probability of them to rest on their proposer. He stated, that many of these *data* held out suppositions most extravagant, but they were put so artfully, that it was impossible not to answer them in the affirmative. However deniable the general conclusions might be, he deemed the whole a list of improbable possibilities, and having spoken to them very fully, gave it as his opinion that the idea of defending the kingdom by Fortifications appeared to him inconsonant to the genius of our constitution, and irreconcilable with the security of the liberties of the people. He said, he should have suggested various other modes of defence of the Kingdom, had he been called upon, but all of them maritime. The Kingdom might have been defended by sending a fleet off Brest, by sending a fleet to the mouth of the Mediterranean to prevent a junction between the fleets, of France and Spain, and by other destinations of our fleets, as the relative situation of other powers might make it proper. Before he sat down, he stated from the papers that he had moved for last Wednesday, the number of troops, including cavalry, that had been in Plymouth, and Scilly, and in Portsmouth during the respective years of the late war, shewing that there had never been above eight thousand men, including three or four regiments of cavalry, in Plymouth any one of those years. After reasoning upon this for some time, and comparing it with the 22,000 men that would be wanted to man the new fortifications (12,000 at Plymouth, and 10,000 at Portsmouth) he asked why had the Enquiry of the Board of Officers been confined to those two Dock Yards? Were we vulnerable no where else, or in no other Dock Yards? Was not Chatham Dock Yard worth looking at? That Dock Yard, and the pass there, were, he maintained, of as much consequence as either, if not both the two others. The General after a variety of very intelligent observations, concluded with

with declaring, he should give his vote for the amendment.

Lord *Hood*, in a very clear and perspicuous manner declared himself a friend to the plan of fortifying the dock yards. He said, no argument could be derived from what this country had done formerly with her navy. The navy of France was very formidable, and so was that of other powers; regard therefore must be had to the present relative situation of the marine of other countries compared with our own marine, and it was from their powerfulness at sea, that it became a wise and prudent measure to fortify our dock yards by which means the whole of our navy would be free to be sent out upon any one or more service in case of war. He put the case of our having a large convoy of merchant ships coming home from the East or West Indies, and we heard of the enemy's having sent out a fleet to meet and intercept them. In that case, in order to save the commerce of the country from a fatal blow, our business would be, instantly to send, as large a fleet as we could spare, to seek the enemy. This we could not do, while our dock yards rested solely for defence on our navy; because, if we sent the whole of our fleet; in that case, France might have a sufficient body of men on her coasts, all ready for embarkation and those she might send across the water in frigates, and such other vessels as were unemployed by her, and fit for the purpose. They might come here, effect the business, do us an irreparable mischief, and get away before our fleet returned; or even they might do the mischief, and instantly surrender us prisoners of war. Lord Hood was decidedly of opinion that it was proper to adopt the proposed system, and that France and other maritime powers of Europe had of late much encreased their Naval force, that Great Britain could not be too cautious in securing the source of our marine from surprise and distress.

Captain *Macbride* in a very able speech, ridiculed the conduct of the noble Duke, respecting the manner of endeavouring to enforce conviction to his own liking on the Board of Naval Officers at Plymouth. The noble Duke had played off a piece of mummery there, he said, which had disgraced him in the eyes of the whole country. He had sent a parcel of boys off in a boat who were to try to effect a landing, and others on shore were to endeavour

deavour to repel them. They had fastened a capstern on shore, and by that means, and the help of a rope drew themselves up the cliff. By the same means, he declared he would teach a Milliner's apprentice to draw a large gun by the help of a coach and horses up to the cross of St. Paul's. Captain Macbride stated an infinite variety of particulars, many of which he put so ludicrously, that the House repeatedly burst into a roar. In the course of his Speech he mentioned, that the Duke had used great art with the Naval Officers to persuade them to be of his opinion, and minutely detailed several transactions that had passed at the Board. He said, all the places they had examined were perfectly secure from any danger of an enemy landing at any of them. He knew a place, however, where an enemy might land. (Mr. Pitt expressing some alarm) The Right Hon. Gentleman, says he, need not be alarmed, I am not going to tell where the place is. He entered into the question of the difficulty of getting Seamen to man our ships in case of necessity, and said he had been pretty much used to that service. He urged the expediency of taking care of the Navy, and not cheating the publick of their money, as was the case at the end of the war before last, when Ships of a smaller size than usual were built, which were good for nothing.

Captain Macbride refuted the illiberal imputation which had been thrown upon the spirit of the inhabitants of the country at large, and of his constituents in particular. He said his hon. Friend Mr. Bastard, on the appearance of the enemy had marched in at the head of two thousand men from the country, that, there were only at the time, five hundred stand of arms in store, with those they took charge of the prisoners and conducted them to Exeter. He then added, that the Gentlemen whom he had the honour of representing, had with a laudable zeal and spirit, formed themselves into two Companies, clothed and arrayed themselves at their own expence, and continued to do duty during the remainder of the last war; to that same independent spirit, when Government presumed to dictate to them in the choice of representation, he was indebted for the honour of a seat in that House.

He vindicated the conduct of himself and of the other Sea Officers of the Board. He complained that the grounds of his dissent, were not laid before the House; especially

as he had declared, that no part of the objections he had made against the Fortifications, or of the papers he had moved for, tended to shew the weakness, but on the contrary the strength of the coast and country, and read extracts from his minutes of the papers he had moved for, which were to the following purport :

LIEUTENANT HOCKING'S CONCLUSION.

I beg leave to observe in this extent of Coast (from Ram-head to Loo) above seventeen miles, the fifteen passes in Whitesand Bay, are in a manner so difficult of access to an enemy, not only from the great rockiness of the shore, but also from the openings of the small Bays or recesses in the coast leading to these passes being so narrow, that should the wind and tide not be favourable at the time of landing, the enemy will run great risque of being carried on the rocks. It is however certain should the enemy effect a landing at any of these sand passes, they are undoubtedly accessible, and by which he may gain the summit of the coast.

But when the great irregularity of those passes is considered in their numerous windings and turnings up steep cliffs, it appears an enemy will not find it so easy an operation to force them, particularly if defended by small breast-works and a few chosen troops at the head of each pass. However to render the access still more difficult, and throw every obstruction possible in the way, so as to retard an enemy's attempts, it would be proper to break up those footings, either by filling the paths with stones and earth, or scarping the ground which would take off the favourable aspect of those passes and render them inaccessible.

It is remarkable, that the high stone and earth fences of the different fields along the coast, at a small distance from the summit of the cliffs, and passes between Ram-head and Loo, form a strong line of entrenchment to line the coast if properly defended.

LAND OFFICERS PROVISIO.

Hisse Guards, June 18th, 1785.

We have consented to the Report of Lieutenant Hocking's, being entered on the minutes, as it has been proposed

fed by some of the Members, but we desire not to be understood as acceding to it in all its parts ; with respect to the number of places, where an enemy can land, and the proper words for this purpose, we rather choose to rest our opinions on the Report, which the Naval Officers of this Board have made on this subject, than on the Report of Lieutenant Hockings.

We the underwritten Sea Officers, desire the following Note may be inserted on the minutes, after the proviso of the Land Officers.

* * The Report of Lieutenant Hockings, Engineer, respecting Whitford Bay, and coast adjacent with the plan accompanying, correspond with the sentiments we entertain of the difficulty of effecting a landing there, if properly opposed, it being no roadstead and so much avoided by our own ships, we can hardly suppose the Fleet of an enemy, will hazard an anchorage there.

S. BARRINGTON,
M. MILBANKE,
T. GRAVES,
W. HOTHAM,
J. MACBRIDE,
A. S. HAMMOND.

Captain Macbride said, that he had corrected gross mistakes in the Report of the shape of the country, part of which was his own estate. He likewise read the Duke of Richmond's order to Lieutenant Hockings, Engineer, which was given without the knowledge of the Sea Officers. Captain Macbride said it appeared to the Board that Lieutenant Hockings was clandestinely employed by the Duke to invalidate the opinion of the Sea Officers ; when it was found to produce the contrary effect, Lieutenant Hockings, who, before was thought well qualified for such an employment, was treated as ignorant and presumptuous, and as a person unknown, until a respectable Member of the Board, on the Engineer department, said he had been bred up under him at Gibraltar, and gave honourable testimony of his character and abilities. Capt. Macbride also exposed and ridiculed the conduct of the noble Duke, who by every art and finesse in his power,

power, had endeavoured to warp the Naval opinions in favour of his system—failing in that, he had recourse to a piece of mummery, which exposed him to the ridicule of the whole country. When Captain Macbride made use of the respectable authority of Admiral Barrington, he not only said he had his authority to say he agreed in opinion with Capt. Macbride, but was ready to come and declare it at the bar of the House of Commons. Indeed, the whole conduct of the Noble Duke, who more properly guided than presided, was without precedent, and it was the first Board of Officers in Council, where question and answer came from the President, and the senior Members. In every other case the junior Officer gave his opinion first;—in this case it was reversed for very obvious reasons.

The Captain summed up his very excellent and entertaining Speech, by declaring himself averse to all unnecessary Fortifications.

The Hon. James Luttrell, (Surveyor General of the Ordnance,) in reply to Colonel Barrè, observed; that
 “ the Fortifications were the only question since the
 “ peace which had drawn forth the attention of that re-
 “ spectable Member to the important business of parlia-
 “ ment, and restored on the Colonel his profuse compli-
 “ ments to our invincible and unlimited Navy as ill suited
 “ to grace the terms of that peace which could not be
 “ thought glorious by comparison with the former peace;
 “ and he hoped no historian would ever be able to praise
 “ it by comparison with any future peace, which an ene-
 “ my should dictate upon the ashes of our Dock Yards.

“ He lamented that it was not proper to lay before
 “ Parliament the whole proceedings of the Military Board.
 “ he wished the nation knew their danger, if that would
 “ induce them to apply a remedy. He wished also to
 “ do justice to the impartial and judicious proceedings
 “ of the Military Board. He read the questions referred
 “ to them by his Majesty’s.” instructions, which he said
 were plain and distinct; and their answers (contained in
 the Report,) were plain and distinct also, the subject could
 not by any other mode of proceeding be more fairly investi-
 gated; the Board had adopted it as the best, and upon Milita-
 ry questions it was not possible to deceive such able and dis-
 tinguished Officers, mislead their judgement, or shake their
 their

their integrity. Every impartial man must agree there was capacity and numbers sufficient for a full and fair consideration of the subject, a great majority had decided every question. If every individual which could be supposed to be partial was struck out, there still remained a great majority in favour of the plan, it was therefore unnecessary to answer invidious and unfair reflections. The Report before Parliament contained only general resolutions; some of the detail necessary to the investigation it could not be proper to make publick, because it related to the various modes of attack to which the Dock Yards now lay exposed and hazarded, and it is not certain that Parliament will apply a remedy to every part of our present weakness; they may perhaps only give partial, instead of full and permanent security. It had been said the datum was not the datum of the Military Board; the Report proved the contrary for the first *unanimous* resolution contained in the Report stated, that they had availed themselves of his Majesty's permission to alter the data, and the very datum so altered declared unanimously, that fortifications were right and necessary for the security of the Docks, in the case of absence of the whole fleet, or such *other causes* as might prevent the fleet from affording its protection to the Docks.

To this datum, the Sea Officers were unanimous. It was enough for them to say the Docks ought to be fortified. They were not called upon to give any of pinion on the construction of forts: that belonged to Engineers and general Officers. If the Sea Officers had thought ships sufficient for the protection of the Docks, they could easily have answered the first question, "whether a Naval defence could be relied on for the defence of the Docks."

The Sea Officers had pointed out where an enemy could land, and fully answered all maritime questions; but except such parts of the construction of a fort was meant to operate against ships, and to guard the entrance of a harbour, they had not at Portsmouth given any opinion. They declared (as appears in the report) that they did not think themselves authorised by his Majesty's instructions to give any opinion of the number of forts or their construction and consistently they could not, nor did not give any opinion upon land defences at Plymouth. The Sea Officers

Officers had also expressly declared, after recommending gun-boats by water for Plymouth, and signal houses on shore, that they had no other improvement or other system of defence to suggest.

He conceived his gallant friend (M^r Bride) saw difficulties for an enemy to surmount in Whitland Bay that he would not call difficulties if opposed to him in any operation on the enemies coast; that to say a landing might be effected if *unopposed*, mixed a land question with a sea question, unopposed might mean to oppose with 10 guns or 1000 guns; and an enemy is not unopposed, if instead of risking the fate of the dock upon the possible event of landing, the object for landing was removed by giving perfect security to the dock. He compared Whitland Bay with Gabruse Bay in America, to shew that greater natural difficulties, added to the opposition of Fortifications, had not been sufficient to prevent British troops from landing in the teeth of the enemies and troops, for the important object of taking Louisburg; and he observed, that great difficulties will always be undertaken for a great object.

Lieutenant Hockings's opinion could not be given in the Report to Parliament, or to his Majesty, because the Military Board were the only persons authorised by his Majesty's instructions to answer such questions as Lieutenant Hockings touched upon. He was sent to make a survey, and his plan and remarks was annexed to the Report; but surely the experienced Generals and Engineers who examined the shore were better judges than Lieutenant Hockings, where troops could get up; and though a correct plan of Whitland Bay shore was necessary; his opinion was neither called for nor of any use; for the Generals could best judge of land operations, and the Sea Officers had given the soundings and pointed out the various places where the ships might approach and troops land.

He went over the so often repeated grounds of the instances of our fleet in the last war, abandoning the defence of the docks, and the difference between the policy of a general system of Fortification to guard against an enemy whose numbers and preparations should be equal to an invasion of this kingdom against the collective force, and the policy of guarding our docks, the vital parts of the

the kingdom; from an enterprize of 20 or 30,000 men in the temporary absence, or in case of the inferiority of our fleet, against our Dock Yards.

Opposition at one moment tell Parliament, our fleets should be kept for the local defence of the docks; the next minute they say we need only guard against a trifling coup de main from 8 to 10,000 men. and the next minute they tell us of apprehensions for Chatham and London, and suppose great facility in 70,000 men coming to invade England. We are likewise told the fortified frontiers of France at a distance from our coast, require the strength of the French Army; then where is the risk of a general invasion? A march of 70,000 men would require time, and give sufficient alarm to collect the strength of this country, and for our fleets to return home. The embarkations must then be of vast magnitude and the operations of an enemy slow, and full of difficulties: but if a coup de main against the docks is to be guarded against, how are we to measure security? Works that can resist 10,000 men, (if a complete system) may with little more expence be strong enough to resist 20,000 men, and if we are weak or exposed in any part, 10,000 men may as effectually destroy the docks as 20 or 30,000: the present system will be necessary to be secure against 10,000 men and it will defend us against a much greater number.

He went into some detail to shew that the French without additional expence in war only by keeping 15 or 20,000 men upon the opposite coast, and when occasion required, by laying an embargo on their coasting vessels, would be at all times prepared in a war to push across the channel, under protection of their fleet, an expedition against our Dock Yards. If 40 sail of the line were to be kept in check by French troops, it allowed a French army virtually to operate as an increase of their Navy, because a superior French fleet could force a landing, if our fleet should be inferior. Forty sail of the line at Brest would not oblige us to keep forty sail of the line to oppose it, except in the case of French troops so situated as to force a landing near our docks, if we suffered our home fleets to be inferior to the enemy. Under this check of preparation for invasion we could not send abroad reinforcements; and for the miserable oeconomy of saving 500,000*l.* Jamaica, Barbadoes, Quebec, or our most valuable

able possessions in the East might fall a sacrifice, and commerce and convoys be abandoned, owing to the inferiority of our fleet in those seas compared with the enemy's, and our home fleet being confined to channel service.

He reminded Mr. Fox of his arguments at the opening of the sessions, threatening us with alliances between the Dutch, the French, the Spaniards, and the Emperor, and a combination of Naval force against us unparalleled in any former period of our history. If it was true that money could be found to build as many ships as all those powers combined, it was no increase of naval strength to build more ships than we can possibly man, and in the last war we never manned an equal number of ships to France and Spain alone, and a very great increase of our seamen was by no means probable; we were told that the best way to secure our docks from invasion would be to meet the French upon the Rhine. He thought it would be wiser and better economy to meet them on the Ocean. We were told the French did not like to attack us, that they would not keep 15 or 20,000 men in the towns and ports of the opposite coast; but by what magic (as extraordinary as any convulsion of nature) could any member of that house set bounds to the ambition of France, or limit the number of their troops, where great objects in view must justify great expence, risk, and great efforts. We were told a future war may be a war of alliance. The object of these Fortifications is to set the Navy at liberty for offensive war, as well as for the defence of our Foreign dependencies; and of all wars, a war of alliance ought to be an offensive war, because if each ally only acts on the defensive, there would be no conquests made by either to balance in the terms of peace the losses which one of the allies, or more than one, might sustain; and the peace, which could not partially be made for the benefit of the one, must end in disgraceful and inglorious terms of peace for the whole.

To relieve our Navy from local stationary service these forts were meant to be erected. If we are weak it is the more necessary: but even if we could launch half our forests, and cover the wide ocean with our numerous fleets, he wished them to go forth for offensive war, for extension of empire, protection of commerce, and for the glory of the British Arms but strongly reprobated their being obliged to

to lie idle, stationary, and sheltered in our ports, a mere defensive, inglorious, unprofitable force.

Speaking of the bad consequence and imbecility of the American war, he concluded by observing, that although it had been said the sun of Britain's glory was sunk in our western hemisphere, we had the consolation to see a glorious sun rise in our own horizon, which though accused of not being yet in its meridian, had already shed its happy influence on this island, so as to restore vigour to the constitution, and such strength to the roots of our resources as promises the fairest prospect of growing prosperity, and of the future happiness and welfare of the British Empire. He inferred that these were no grounds for despondency, nor for profusion; but that to grant the necessary supplies for so important a service, was state economy, as well as sound policy.

He entered into some detail to justify the estimates for the fortifications. It admitted of a great degree of accuracy; first because the utmost extent of the works is ascertained, and the declared object of appointing the Military Board, and adopting a system of defence complete in all its parts, was to guard against future alterations which might endanger the safety of the docks and lead Parliament to expences which they could not foresee: therefore, without another Military Board being appointed, and a Parliament inclined to fortify beyond what was sufficient to completely defend the docks, the present system could never be enlarged, and it was not likely this would happen, especially as the present Parliament may in five years see the whole completed.

He observed the expences may fairly be considered under three heads, namely, the land, the materials, and the labour, that the land had been assessed by a jury and the remainder lay so contiguous, that its value was easily estimated; this head of expence must therefore be nearly perfect, that as to materials such as stone, brick, timber, &c. the present existing contracts with the Board of Ordnance, gives the exact price and the measurement of the plans and sections, the exact quantity except the calculation for foundations which in some places might require more, and in some places less materials. But this head of expence must be nearly accurate, and that with respect to labour it was the only head of expence which could not by any rule or regulation be calculated

to a certainty, but upon this and all other articles, a great and liberal allowance had been provided and one tenth of the calculated amount of the whole, added that there might be no probability of the estimate before Parliament being exceeded, and the whole amount of new works for Plymouth and Portsmouth, would be within the sum of 500,000*l.* the other 200,000*l.* was for repairs and completing old works which must be done, whether the new works are erected or not.

He remarked on several other parts of the Report, and concluded by insisting there were but two negatives (M^r Bride and Graves) to some additional Fortifications being necessary. That all admitted the noble Duke's system would completely defend the docks in case of the absence or inferiority of our fleets, but if we reject that security, and keep an equal home fleet with the enemy for our defence, he feared such a measure must, in its consequences, naturally reduce our sovereign from being monarch of an empire, to be king of the single Island of Great Britain.

Hon. G. Berkley said, that so much had been spoken upon the subject, and so many abler persons had delivered their opinions, that he should only trouble the House with recapitulating what he had asserted in a former debate, long before the Board of Officers had been appointed; but he could not help taking notice of what had fallen from a Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Fox) on a former day, which had again been echoed to day, viz. that the plan ascribed to a Noble Duke was unconstitutional. He wished when he chose to make a panegyrick upon his and his own noble Relation, that he had stated to the House, in that masterly language which made him the admiration of mankind, what he *knew* and *felt*; that the Noble Duke would be the last man in England to patronize, and would die sooner than propose any plan which could militate against the constitution of this Country.

Having said this, he desired to be understood, that like the Right Hon. Gentleman, no ties of blood, nor any other consideration could induce him to give his vote for any thing which he did not think perfectly right. As to his own idea of their being unconstitutional, he could not conceive they were more so, than any others which

which were already begun or finished in England, and to make them so, recourse must be had to the Hon. General's (Burgoyne) Catalogue of *Improbable Improbabilities*.

As to the necessity of some Fortifications, especially at Plymouth, to which he begged to confine himself, he was enabled to speak with as much, and it would not be arrogance to say, more certainty, than any man in that House, and if they did not choose to give him credit for what he asserted, they might call the general Officers commanding there, and ask them their opinion of Fortifications at the critical and important moment when the French Fleet were off Plymouth, of which he was a spectator and he hoped not an idle one, and would be bound to say, that not a soul there but wished for Fortifications. He asserted that the enemy could have landed, and he would not go into suppositions like his Hon. Friend (Macbride) as to winds and weather, but that it could have been effected at any hour of the day or night of the time the enemy remained there, at the very spot which these Forts were meant to defend.

He thought the most strenuous opposers of the plan would not ensure us a permanent peace, nor would they ensure us in case of a war, the same honour and abilities at the head of the Admiralty, which the Noble Lord now there, or his predecessors possessed; he did not know, but if a war happened, we might be *curst* with the same mismanagement in that department as we experienced during the war, when our Fleets were sent sculking away, and our coasts, our convoys and our docks left totally unprotected. Indeed when the Hon. General had moved for papers, he thought it was for the purpose of investigating and probing into the errors of the last war, and to make the Noble Lord, that vigilant and *wakeful* Minister*, account for the losses we had sustained in *America*, and those we were near suffering at home.

This was one reason for his supporting the plan; but another, and a stronger was, that as a sailor and a well-wisher to the service, in which he would give way to no man, he wished to see the Fleet properly employed

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* Lord North happened to be fast asleep at this time,

in war, in annoying the enemy; for he only agreed with the best writers upon the subject when he said, that England in a war with France, ought always to act upon the offensive, as in acting otherwise, she gave up all her natural advantages, and inspirited the foe. If this was true, the proposed Fortifications would be of essential use; as instead of cramping the operations of the Fleet, it would assist them as the Commander in Chief would act with more vigour against the enemy, when he knew our Coasts and our Dock Yards to be safe and protected.

In this plan of war, he thought his friend (Macbride) would join him, as he would have an opportunity to display that spirit of enterprize in the *petit guerre*, for which he was so distinguished; but he found, that instead of assisting, he had opened his lower tier against it; but he knew, that he depended upon his constituents for defending that part of the coast; but he surely would have acted more for the safety of them, if he had voted a breastwork for them to fire over, as he was sure they would have felt more comfortable behind that, and taken better aim, than if opposed face to face with a French grenadier.

As to the language of the Hon. Member for that county, (Devon), he was astonished, he was confounded to hear him assert as the language of his constituents, that they would not defend the Country; or give their assistance in case of an attack, if this question was carried; surely, the blessings of peace and a few years could not have altered their ideas so much; for last war he remembered that very Gentleman heading some hundreds at Plymouth, and so far from thinking Fortifications a wrong thing, they were employed in repairing and strengthening the wretched ones which were there already.

He then apologized to the House for taking up so much of their time, but that he would conclude with begging them to take notice, that so much had been said of our weakness, and our true situation had been laid so open, that if these or some works were not erected and a war to ensue, he trembled for the consequences; but that those Gentlemen, who had opposed them, must answer for the event. He wished they might not find an old but

but homely proverb verified, " That they had been penny wise and pound foolish."

Commodore *Bowyer* pronounced himself a friend to the original motion, for which he stated his reasons; but said, justice, and a sense of his duty to his country, obliged him at the same time to declare, that a greater degree of attention ought to be paid to the Navy, when the Fortifications were going on, than ever, and that both ought to go on hand in hand together. The Commodore reprehended the neglect of the Navy during the last peace, and particularly recommended it to Ministers to take care that a number of young men were properly trained up and educated for the service, so that in case of a rupture, there might be a sufficient number of young men qualified for petty officers. The want of this, he said, was severely felt at the commencement of the last war.

Sir *Charles Middleton* said, when the matter had been first agitated a Session or two since, he had great scruples upon the subject; but he was now persuaded, that the proposed measure was wise, prudent, and necessary. The securing the Dock Yards was certainly a great object; but a still stronger reason operated in his mind in its favour, and that was, it would enable us to have the full use of our Navy in case of a war. This was likely to be a most essential advantage; and had we possessed it last war, he was firmly of opinion we should not have failed so often as we had done. Sir Charles put a case in point, and reasoned upon it, to shew that though we might not be equal to our enemy upon the whole in point of naval force, yet there occurred several situations at sea, in which we might make ourselves so.

Colonel *Barré* spoke with his wonted energy, and manly firmness, against the original motion. He began with putting his decisive negative upon the position, that it was either right, or wise, or expedient, to fortify the Dock Yards; and if the abstract question were to depend upon his answer, he declared he would say NO to it in the most direct and unreserved manner. With regard to the argument of his Right Hon. Friend, who had opened the business with so much eloquence, he must deny it, and every part of it. When the House had done him the honour to adopt his advice last Session, was it to be imagined, that, by his recommending a Board of Naval
and

and Land Officers, men of high rank, known experience, and admitted ability, to enquire into, and report the most proper and fit mode of *defence of the kingdom*, he meant a paltry, narrow, circumscribed plan of fortifying two Dock Yards? He had not the smallest idea of any such scheme. He had been struck with the grand conduct of the wisest princes that ever reigned, who, at a period of extreme peril, had taken advantage of the collective wisdom of both services, the Navy and Army. He had read a pamphlet, published under the auspices of the noble Duke, on the subject of Fortification, last year; and meeting with a passage that provoked his indignation, it occasioned his coming down to the House last Session, on the day that the Ordnance Estimates were to be voted; and while sitting in his place, and hearing the arguments that were then urged, he rose and delivered his opinion, in the course of which, warmed, and glowing with the importance of the matter in discussion, he had asked, with some emphasis, "Who was the man that *dared* limit the extent of the Navy of England, or circumscribe the exertions of this country in the increase of her marine?" That question he must put again, because the attempt was again made to do so presumptuous an act; an act little short of treason to the state! It gave him, the Colonel said, infinite pain to differ in opinion from his Right Hon. friend before him; but his duty to his country demanded that he should speak out, and let no personal attachments, however strongly they clung about his heart, stand between him and the exercise of his honour, in doing his utmost in endeavouring to avert the disgrace, perhaps the ruin, that awaited the remaining parts of the British empire, if so rash, so mischievous a plan as that in contemplation, was permitted to be carried into effect. The Colonel recapitulated all that had passed upon the subject last Session, and said, the sort of Board of General Officers, and the objects to which they were to direct their attention, as well as the manner of directing it, were far, far different indeed from the constitution of the Board that had been instituted, the mode of their proceeding, the result of their enquiry, and the Report they had made; the whole of which was so curious, that it was worth the while of the House to trace it regularly, and view it collectively. The Colonel in this part of his speech, recapitulated

recapitulated all the steps that had been taken from the period of his having advised the institution of a General Board of Naval and Military Officers, to the day of the extracts from the Report coming before the House. He marked every part of the proceeding, and held it up as a series of instances of artful management, misapplication of time and talents, and useless enquiry. He said, the Board he meant, was a Board of great, respectable, and *independent* characters; men who had no vote to give, no favours to look for, no frowns to fear—men who would have done their duty without consideration whom the result would please, or whom it would displease. Their object was to have been to enquire into and report the best *mode of defence of the Kingdom*, and in pursuit of such an object they would not have confined themselves to two petty spots, but would have acted on a large scale, and cast their eyes round the Kingdom. They would not have compressed their business into ten days at Portsmouth, and ten days at Plymouth, but have employed a due proportion of time in a deliberate discharge of their duty. If Portsmouth and Plymouth ought to be fortified, Chatham and Sheerness, and Dover and Harwich, and Yarmouth ought to be secured likewise, nor ought the North to go unregarded. The Colonel in this manner pursued his subject in an animated style, till at length he came to talk of the Duke of Richmond personally. The noble Duke, he said, had great abilities, and great assiduity; he was astute, logical, and perfect master of argument in debate. No wonder he was too much for a set of brave Officers, used chiefly to out with their lower deck tier, and make ready for action. The noble Duke was fond of engineering, *diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis*—and (to do him justice) he was no bad engineer. Let him, says the Colonel, employ himself in engineering; but not at the expence of the public! Having pursued this vein some way, the Colonel compared the Duke's qualifications, for, contriving, and carrying into execution, this, or any other plan of Fortification with those of General Conway, Lord Amherst, or Lord Townsend, all of whom, by procuring himself to be appointed President of the Board, he had excluded from their seats at that Board. He dilated on their respective services, and characters, and

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next shewed, that the office of Master General of the Ordnance, was a Civil Office, and not unfrequently held by a person who was not a Military Officer. He instanced the case of the Old Duke of Montague. He added as another characteristick of the noble Duke, at this time Master General, that he was known *never to have given up a point in his life*; and that, he said, added to his being so astute, rendered it impossible for the respectable Naval and Land Officers who had sat at the Board, to cope with him in a logical contest. He desired not to be understood as meaning to cast any imputation on the gentlemen who had constituted that Board; he revered their characters, and bowed to their authority; it was the mode of institution that had been resorted to, and not the men that he condemned. In speaking of the uselessness of fortifications, he stated the erecting untenable lines of circumvallation, as giving strength to the enemy and instanced in proof of his assertion, the fact of Lord Amherst's having possessed himself of the Lines of Ticonderoga, which the enemy out of weakness in point of numbers had abandoned, and which served Lord Amherst as an useful shelter for his men, from the enemy's fire. He paid Mr. Pitt many compliments, and said, he could only account for his having taken so active a part in recommending so wild and useless a project, by supposing that his *Conscience had been surprized*, or he would not have assisted at all. In that part of his speech where he talked of the presumption of limiting the Navy, or saying that our marine should be circumscribed, he referred to a list of papers, copies of which had formerly been laid on the table; whence it appeared, that we had during the last war 120 sail of the line at sea, and ninety-five thousand seamen on board, when the House had only voted 80,000, notwithstanding the number of British seamen on board privateers, and notwithstanding also the great drain occasioned by so many of the profligate of England, Scotland, and Ireland, having flown to America, entered on board their ships and other foreign vessels, and fought against their country. The Colonel took great offence at the Right Hon. Gentleman's having given the peace, the cold epithet of a *necessary* peace. It was, he said, a great and *glorious* peace; and notwithstanding what had been

been said in that House, and without doors about it, the author of that happy event daily received the gladson gratulations of the whole kingdom, for having wrought so happy a work. The Noble Lord, when he made it, was aware of his danger. He had honoured him with his confidence, and had said, "I know, if I do not make a peace immediately, I can keep my place; if I do make it, I shall essentially serve my country, at this time sinking under the weight of almost exhausted resources, and utterly incapable of continuing the war, but I shall lose my situation. I disdain, however, all considerations of a personal and self interested nature; I will make a peace, be my risque what it may!" This was the magnanimity the Noble Lord had acted with; the confidence the Court of Versailles had in him, made the arduous task somewhat less difficult, and this country was now experiencing the blessings, the wealth, and the vigour, which flowed from the tranquility that had been effected. After an infinite variety of argument, anecdote, remark, and point, he desired to be understood as not meaning to hold himself out a skilful Engineer; he was none, nor could he pretend to any great military skill. He had been long *invalided*, most honourably indeed, more so than he deserved.

Mr. *Moses Hawkins Bayne* in a short speech said he was happy to find that a zeal for the Navy was universal on all sides of the House, that he hoped that would always be the darling service of this country but he was astonished to hear the importance of the Navy urged as an argument against those Fortifications when it was the only argument for them, for these Fortifications were not intended to substitute a new species of defence for the kingdom in lieu of our Navy, but to protect our Dock Yards, and our Dock Yards only which were our most vital and vulnerable parts, because they were the gem and support our Navy, he observed in reference to what Colonel Barre had said that magnanimity was the best publick virtue in times of vigorous enterprize or in those moments of eminent danger we had experienced in 1779, and in 1782, But that prudence was a national virtue as well as magnanimity, and the most fit to be exercised when we had a prospect of long continuance of peace, as he hoped we now had, and when we might contemplate to advantage our former dangers, and pursue the wisest means to prevent

the return of them. Fortifications, he observed, were not new in this country, large sums had been lavished upon them in every former war, but this was the first time a regular plan had been laid before that House not dictated by the pressure of immediate necessity, not dependent upon the opinion of any minister or the caprice of any Master General of the Ordnance, but approved by the first military and naval characters in this country. This was to him and must be to most members of that House, in a great measure, a question of confidence. But in, whom were we to place confidence if not in the executive Government calling upon us for the publick defence, and supported by the names which appeared in the report, a report to him perfectly satisfactory, and in the most essential parts unanimous, he concluded with pressing strongly upon the House if by their rejection of this plan, by their refusing this confidence they should live to see our Dock Yards destroyed, and the seeds and sources of our future Navies annihilated, how they could ever forgive themselves or make atonement to their constituents and the publick?

Mr. *Courtenay* said, he hoped for the attention of the House on this very important comprehensive question, as he would endeavour to compress what he had to say in as few words as possible, and would neither trespass on their patience, by prolixity or repetition. At the same time he begged leave to declare, to prevent all possibility of misconstruction—that in opposing the present system of Fortification, he acted from no personal spleen to the noble Duke at the head of the Ordnance department. He had always been treated with great civility and flattering attention by the noble Duke, and should always esteem the approbation, he (Mr. *Courtenay*) had received of his official conduct from so accurate and discriminating a judge; as a singular honour. Mr. *Courtenay* then adverted to the very peculiar circumstances under which the Board of Land and Naval Officers was constituted. It certainly never was understood, when the House of Commons reposed that unbounded confidence in the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he would appeal to Gentlemen on both sides of the House, whether they entertained the most distant ideas at the time, of any intention to make the noble Duke President of such a Board, whose sole object and express purpose it was, to investigate, and report on the merits of a plan of Fortification, projected by the noble Duke

Duke himself. If there was nothing reprehensible but the indecorum of such an appointment, he should take but little notice of it, but when by this management, the country was deprived of the abilities and assistance of some very able and experienced Officers, it deserved the severest animadversion. He did not profess to give any invidious preference to one military man over another, not being a judge of the competent merits of Military Officers; but this he begged leave to say, that in a general view, age, experience, and long service, gave a decisive superiority in the Military profession. Still he acknowledged there were sometimes, but rarely, illustrious exceptions to be met with; there were extraordinary characters who mastered every science, rather by intuition than study. But surely, the most partial of the Duke's friends would scarce venture to rank him among beings of this very uncommon and superior class. He would therefore submit it to the House, as he was sure it would excite indignant feelings in their breasts, when they were told, that General Conway, Lord Amherst, and Lord Viscount Townshend, found themselves at once degraded and excluded, by receiving a circular letter from the Secretary of State, to place themselves under the controul and command of the noble Duke. The public were insulted by having their names ostentatiously displayed in the Gazette, at the very moment they found themselves obliged to decline the service. For how could General Conway, Lord Amherst, and Lord Townshend, consistent with their own dignity, and with military honour, serve as Members of a Board of Land and Naval Officers under the Duke of Richmond? The only alternative left them was to decline the service, regretting, at the same time, that the very disagreeable and embarrassing situation in which they were placed, obliged them to take such a step. The next thing the publick had a right to expect was this—that able and experienced Officers should be substituted in the room of those who were thus studiously, and perhaps he might add, assiduously excluded.—Was this the case?—No;—Why was not Sir Henry Clinton's name placed on the list? Early distinguished for his military skill and spirit; the friend and favourite of the Hereditary Prince. Would it be suspected that he had adopted the sentiments of the Duke of Brunswick, on the expediency

and utility of Fortifying Portsmouth? Did the House know the opinion the Hereditary Prince gave on that subject? What he did say probably did not apply to the noble Duke, for he only said (after viewing the works and posts with a military eye (that no Officer who knew how to manœuvre and station a corps of troops properly, would dream of defending Portsmouth by Fortifications. Let us now contemplate the noble Duke, President of the Board declaring *ex cathedra*, laying down his hypothetical *sollygisms* proving his own data, by the *modus ponens*, and confuting all objections by the *modus tollens*, amidst the applause of his own Engineers, amidst the roar of his own artillery.

The noble Duke judiciously attacked them with the only species of weapons with which they were unacquainted, and obtained an easy, decisive, and glorious victory. Suppose we now revert to the probable expence of these projected Fortifications, and observe their progressive increase, even on the noble Duke's own estimate. In the year 1783, four or five hundred thousand pounds was stated as sufficient to compleat the intended works at Portsmouth and Plymouth for the security of the Dock Yards.---In 1785, 692,562l. was stated as the probable amount, in the Military Memoir presented to the House, and signed by the Master General, and the other Members of the Board of Ordnance. In the year 1786 the estimate of the charge for compleating the works, amounts to 760,079l. almost double the original sum, notwithstanding this last estimate had been reduced by the economical labours of the Committee of Engineers at the Tower, who had cut off near 50,000l. from Col. Dixon's calculation. This able and experienced Engineer had added a third, and assigned this reason for doing so, to provide for extraordinaries which he could not foresee.---However, he was called upon to specify what he had already said, he could not foresee, and on his not complying, 50,000l. was struck off his estimate by the Committee of Engineers, which at least was a short and compendious mode of deciding the question. Now, if we add a third more on the whole of the estimate for 1786, it will amount to very nigh a million. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated it so. Now supposing the Fortifications compleated, and a million expended, the bare interest

interest of the sum is 50,000l. if we add to this, three of four per cent. for repairs (no unreasonable computation) besides the interest on that capital which still remains to be laid out for artillery, stores &c. the whole annual charge perpetually entailed on this exhausted and impoverished country, will be 100,000l. at least. To some gentlemen this might appear but a trifle; but let it be considered that every burthen is of a mixed and blended nature, not solely to be estimated from the sum raised, but connected with the capacity of the people to bear it. Before the late unfortunate war; before the glorious prodigality of the German war, the people of the country were perhaps better able to bear an annual charge of 500,000l. than 50,000l. at present. Mr. C. then alluded to what fell from an hon. Gentleman (Mr. Walwyn) that the profuseness of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this instance might induce the public to impute his conduct rather to private political motives than enlarged patriotic principles. For his own part, he reprobated such an idea,—still he could not answer for the invidious construction of others, who might conceive it possible for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to sacrifice a million to gratify the whim, conciliate the obstinacy, and insure the precarious attachment of one capricious, projecting individual. However, if a political, he would not say, cordial friendship could be promoted by such means, he had little objection. If the hands of Government could be strengthened by Fortifying the Dock Yards, a million was but a trifle to effect such a salutary purpose. If the principle was fairly avowed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or any of his vouching friends, he would vote for the noble Duke's Fortification; confident as he was, that it would promote peace, unanimity and concord in the Cabinet, where it was sometimes so much wanted, and always so essentially requisite. Besides, the beneficial effects would not stop there—faction would be depressed and confounded; the petitions on the table would be withdrawn; the murmurs and complaints of the people would cease, if it was once avowed that the House of Commons had generously voted away a million of their constituents money, for the sole and express purpose of cementing an alliance between two such great personages as the Master General of the Ordnance and the Chancellor

lor. of the Exchequer. To establish an adequate fund for the payment of the interest, and other incidental expences, he hoped the Shop Tax would be made perpetual, and the produce of it unalienably applied to the building of Fortifications.

Mr. Courtenay then begged leave to observe, lest the panegyric passed on the noble Duke in an eulogium, by an hon. Gentleman (General Burgoyne) should make too strong an impression on the House, that the noble Duke's skill was rather problematical, and indeed held in very slight estimation, by professional Officers with whom he had conversed on the subject.---He had been told that there was a battery erected at South Sea Castle, by the noble Duke himself; nobody disputed the honour of it with him; it was his own unclaimed dividend: many of the guns were so injudiciously placed, that they would not bear on the designed object,--the buoy on the spit; on firing, their recoil endangered the battery;--and the narrow enclosed casemates were so well contrived, to prevent the escape of the smoke, that on quick firing, the gunners must perish like bees suffocated in a hive. What should we think of the noble Duke's line of defence, from Stokes Bay to Frater Lake, above three miles in extent? He would appeal to any Military man, whether an enemy's column might not, with the utmost facility, and with very little danger penetrate between his two projected Forts, and his boasted works must then fall at once. Was it ever discussed, or was it ever moved as a proposition by the noble Duke, and submitted to the Board, whether Magazines (bomb proof) might not be built in the centre of Portsea Island, at a very inconsiderable expence, and whether an immense sum might not be saved by confining our Military works to that Island alone? A bomb-proof Magazine (he spoke from the unquestionable authority of an excellent Engineer) of about 400 rods of brick work would hold almost double the quantity of combustible Stores contained in the Dock Yard at Portsmouth. This at 10l. per rod

Filling up the inside

4000 0 0
1000 0 0

Another at Plymouth

5000 0 0
5000 0 0

10,000 0 0

In

*W. Courtenay had this Estimate from
W. Gleason*

In short, the very respectable Board of Naval and Land Officers were attacked by surprise, and surrounded and besieged by the noble Duke's new raised corps of data, axioms, postulata, lommæ, conellaries, and hypothetical syllogisms, and soon found themselves reduced to surrender at discretion. Seriously, they found themselves absolutely precluded from considering the general defence of the kingdom, combined in all its circumstances, on a large and comprehensive view;—and only specially appointed to examine the noble Duke's plans for Portsmouth and Plymouth, and report accordingly. Mr. Courtenay begged leave to remark, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had always, and indeed, rather triumphantly laid it down as an incontrovertible datum, that the very existence of our fleet depended on the stores in our two Dock Yards. Was the fact so? Thank God it was not; the Right Hon. Gentleman had again that day, with his usual eloquence, in all the fascinating pomp of declamation, enobled and dignified—hemp, tar, pitch and oakum, turpentine and sail-cloth, by the name, stile and title of the Seeds and Stamina of the future Navies of England. Was this the language of a British statesman? Was this the language of a well informed enlightened British Minister? For his part, he had always formed a very different idea on the subject—he had always thought that the seeds and stamina of our fleets consisted in an unbounded commerce, in the superior skill and gallantry of our Naval Officers, in the hardiness and intrepidity of the British Sailors—in the freedom of the British constitution, which diffused a spirit of independence to the lowest individual of the community.—Such were the true stamina of our Navy; of that Navy to which Britain was indebted for her empire and her glory, and which had extended her fame to the extremities of the globe.

“ In vain the nation has conspired her fall,

“ Her trench the sea, and fleets her floating wall.”

But could the Right Hon. Gentleman be ignorant, that there are ten times the quantity of naval stores in the Merchants warehouses in the river, than were ever at one time in the King's stores at Portsmouth or Plymouth.—How many ships of the line were launched last war from slips in the river? Where did the East India Company build
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the Asia, Ganges, and the Bombay? Did not a noble Lord contract with a private builder for the ship he designed as a present to the King; but to his great regret, was most unluckily prevented from accomplishing his patriotick design, by that *necessary* peace which a noble Earl made—and the Chancellor of the Exchequer signed. Mr. Courtenay then expatiated on the spirit and generous exertions of the country Gentlemen of England, who had last year compelled the Minister, however reluctant, to suspend the noble Duke's plans, and even put his office in commission, and now, by their perseverance and patriotism would probably put an end to a scheme pregnant with every mischief. If this Military projector was not checked in his career, none could know what consequence might ensue. A Master General, with his Committee, of Engineers, like the Leputan Philosophers in their flying island might hover over the kingdom in an Ordnance balloon, descend in a moment, and seize on any man's house and domain—(Mr. Cary would not be the only sufferer,) draw out their scales and compasses, or sketch out their works. The country Gentlemen would find their terraces converted into bastions, their slopes into glacis, their pleasure grounds and shrubberies into horn works and crown works to which they have hitherto borne an irreconcilable aversion. But where was this system to end? Who could set bounds to it?—If Portsmouth and Plymouth were to be covered with Military works, to preserve the Naval stores, London should be fortified on the same principle. Ridiculous as this project might now appear, there was once a serious design entertained of carrying it into execution. For the truth of the fact, he would appeal to the venerable records of the Board of Aldermen, to the authentick minutes of the Board of Ordnance. When the Pretender in the year 1745, or to speak in more courtly language (the Grandson of James II.) had slipped the royal army and advanced as far as Stone, the Board of Aldermen took no false alarm. The Lord Mayor sent a circular letter to every Member, commanding his attendance, constituted himself president, drew up a set of instructions to direct their proceedings: and after a long debate, it was at last unanimously agreed, to apply to the Duke of Newcastle, to send them an Engineer; and on such an arduous occasion, they did not choose to en-

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trust the defence of the metropolis, to the city surveyor—his office therefore (like the noble Duke's) was put in commission, Colonel Lascelles was actually appointed for this duty, and was directed to wait on the Lord Mayor and Aldermen with a plan and estimate but an express critically arriving with an account of the highlanders retreating to Scotland, put a stop to this wise project. If we were resolved to provide against all possible dangers by fortification, why should not Newcastle, Sunderland, and many other important places be secured in this way? The noble Duke, from a principle of gratitude, would not leave our collieries exposed to an attack; and they would equally affect the partial attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; as he had early, with infinite sagacity, perceived in them the seeds and stamina of future taxation. Mr. Courtenay then alluded to what a Right Hon. Gentleman (Col. Barré) had rather, he thought, invidiously introduced, a sort of comparison between the commission issued to Sir Walter Raleigh and others, the first military characters of the age, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and the late circular letter and instructions to the noble Duke. This was tender and delicate ground: otherwise, he had a strong inclination to say—*Rex facit Elizabeth olim nunc est Regina Jacobus*. Mr. Courtenay said, he now clearly perceived the reason why the Right Hon. Gentleman had, with his usual point and energy, objected to the Master General's having a seat in the cabinet; for as our navy was to be increased, our army diminished, by the singular expedient of building fortifications. If we were to credit the Chancellor of the Exchequer (though all this appeared an Ordinance conundrum to him) why might not the want of allies be supplied in the same manner? It was only carrying the system one step farther; on this supposition the Right Hon. Gentleman (Col. Barré) might justly apprehend, that the Master General would act consistently with his own principles, and oppose any alliance in the cabinet, lest it should make his fortifications less expedient and necessary. Indeed, this was the most singular, and at the same time the most versatile project that ever was devised. In other ages, and in other countries, the

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increase of the military establishment was always deemed an essential when the fortifying system took place: otherwise it became relative weakness. But the noble Duke had so contrived it, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer became his voucher, that it would reduce our standing army, increase our fleet, and furnish us with firm and steady confederates in the day of peril. By a sort of second sight, we were to discover allies in pentagonal forts, and a squadron of the line in a chain of redoubts. Mr. Courtenay observed, that several Gentlemen had justly stigmatized the fortifying system as dangerous, and inimicable to freedom and the constitution. He should take the liberty of offering to the House, the sentiments of a great and celebrated political writer on the subject: Baron Montesquieu expressly applauds the watchful jealousy of the English in not permitting the executive government to erect military works and fortifications, as by such means despotism may be established under the specious pretext of protecting the kingdom against a foreign enemy. Historical facts confirmed the principle. In the reign of Charles the First, the glorious efforts of our ancestors would not have proved successful, if Portsmouth had then been surrounded with the present projected works; and Lord Clarendon justly remarks, that the possession of this place was almost reckoned decisive in the contests between the King and Parliament. However, he did not mean to draw any invidious parallel between those inglorious and the present auspicious times. But we might not always be blessed with a gracious Prince; we might not always have a mild, unassuming, virtuous Minister.

“ A King might arise who knew not Joseph.”

Still it was the duty of the Representatives of the people, to guard posterity against those evils which they were not apprehensive of suffering themselves. Mr. Courtenay concluded, by calling forcibly and with energy on every man, who felt for the rights and liberties of his country, who venerated the glorious Constitution of England; as it behoved every man to reflect seriously, before he gave his voice on a proposition of such dangerous tendency. The proposition

position moved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the suggestion of the noble Duke, went directly to depreciate the British navy, and to substitute a new and fallacious mode of defence in its room. A new and degrading species of discipline was to be introduced. The British soldier was to be left.

“ To lurk in the trench, and skulk behind the line.”

In his conscience and honour he believed the vote of that night would be decisive; fatally decisive indeed, if the amendment proposed by the Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bastard) was not carried.

Lord George Lenox rose, to state that the Hon. Gentleman who spoke last, had not been correct in the facts he had adverted to. In one instance he knew that the Hon. Gentlemen had said, what was not strictly the fact; the fortification at South Sea Castle, built by the Master General of the Ordnance, he had seen fire and it had not the defect of letting its guns run back, nor of smothering the men with their smoke, (this Mr. Courtenay had mentioned in the course of his Speech, as having been told him by an officer). Lord George said, the Hon. Gentleman had a manner of delivering his sentiments that might divert himself, and it hurt not any body; but he appealed to the Hon. General near the Hon. Gentleman, if the fact were as the Hon. Gentleman had stated it to be?

General Burgoyne declared, that so called upon, he could not, as a man of honour, refuse to say, that he had seen the fortress, and that he had not observed the inconvenience in question.

Mr. Courtenay rose again, and said he had not asserted the fact as a fact that had come within his own knowledge, but had merely stated that such a fact had been told him by an engineer. The House, he had no doubt, would hear what others had to support the subject; & approved

*Capt. Murr of the Army, who The
Immediately rose, & confirmed / from his
inspection & examination) what Mr. P. had
asserted.*

The Hon. Charles *Marshall* rested his objection to the proposed system of Fortifications, chiefly on the difference of opinion that prevailed between the Naval and Land Officers who formed the Board of Enquiry. In all points of so peculiar and technical a nature, he said, the authority of the Land and Sea Officers would have great weight with him, and had he reason to think that the Board had been fairly and impartially constituted, and that their opinion had been unanimous in favour of the proposed system, he should in that case have given his vote in its support, but from what he had heard from the Hon. and Gallant Officer near him (Captain M^r Bride,) he was led to imagine, that the reverse was the fact. Mr. Marshall took notice of something that had fallen from Sir Charles Middleton in favour of the proposed system of Fortification; and in order to shew what had been the prevailing opinion of the best and wisest Statesmen on the subject of insular defence, when the danger of invasion was most dreaded, he read the following extract from a letter written by Sir Nicholas Throgmorton to Secretary Burleigh in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. "In any wise, Mr. Secretary, tend your force, credit, and devise to maintain and encrease your Navy by all the means you can possible; for in this time, considering all circumstances, it is the flower of England's garland, animate and cherish as many as you can to serve by sea. Let them neither want good deeds, nor good words. It is your *best* and *most cheap* defence, and most redoubted of your enemies and doubtful friends, there is not so many perrils in it, as there is to depend upon *fortresses*: neither the charges be like."

Lord *Mabon* rose and said, that he could assure the House, that he was of opinion, that the encreasing the *Army* was *not* the best way to encrease the *Navy*. But that it had always been his opinion, that a *Standing Army* ought to be an object of *constitutional jealousy* in this Country. That no consideration whatever should ever induce him to support this plan of the Duke of Richmond's, if it had *not* been proved to the House, that this plan

plan would tend to *decrease*, instead of tending to *increase* the number of troops necessary to be employed to defend the Dock Yards.

He then read the following Extracts from the Report of the Board of Land and Sea Officers, who had been appointed to examine the Duke of Richmond's plan of Fortifications.

"Your Majesty's Land Officers (at Portsmouth) are unanimously of opinion, that the proposed finishing of works already begun, the improvements to old ones, and the plan for rebuilding South Sea Castle, will, together with the new works proposed, give a reasonable degree of security to your Majesty's Dock Yard at Portsmouth, for the time and under the circumstances of the *data*, with a garrison of the numbers before specified (Regulars and Militia) which the Land Officers are of opinion, is sufficient for its defence; whereas *the present works*, even when repaired, finished, and improved, *would require a larger force for their defence*, with which they would still be *ineffectual* for the purpose of securing this Dock Yard.

"Your Majesty's Land Officers (at Plymouth) are unanimously of opinion, that a garrison (of the numbers before specified, Regulars and Militia) appears sufficient, if the proposed new works and repair of old ones are executed, and that for *the present works*, even when repaired, *a much larger garrison*, would be *ineffectual* for the purpose of securing the Dock Yard."

And at the end of this Report, a *still stronger fact* is proved, viz.

"*The works we recommend appear to us to be calculated upon the most economical principles, and to require the smallest number of troops possible to answer the purpose of effectually securing your Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth.*"

Signed

Signed	Charles Grey,
Richmond,	James Pattison.
Guy Carleton,	Sam. Cleaveland,
Will. How,	James Bramham,
Geo. H. Lennox,	William Green,
Cornwallis,	William Roy
David Lindsay,	George Garth,

Lord Mahon said, that the question *was not*, whether there should be *fortifications*, or *no fortifications*, to defend the Dock Yards; but, that the question *was*, whether the *present existing fortifications* which require a very *large* body of troops to man them, and which are *not* adequate to the defence of the Dock Yards; or whether the *plan proposed by the Duke of Richmond*, which will require a much *smaller* number of troops to man them, and which will give *security* to the Dock Yards, ought to be *preferred*.

Mr. Sheridan rose immediately on Lord Mahon's sitting down, and began a speech of nearly two hours, of many parts of which we lament it is only in our power to give a sketch or outline, with declaring, that he gave the Noble Lord full credit for the principles he had professed, with respect to the constitution; and that he did sincerely believe, that the Noble Lord would not vote for the measure then under discussion, but upon a supposition, that its tendency was rather to diminish than augment the military power of the Crown; upon this ground, therefore, he would meet him, and he was sanguine enough to believe, that the Noble Lord might be induced to alter the opinion he had declared, unless indeed

indeed he was restrained from exercising his free judgment upon the subject, an apprehension which a late speech of his had suggested, a speech in which the Noble Lord had expressed himself so full of dread and horror, at the means by which a Tory foe in another place had both by sap and storm assailed those constitutional bulwarks, which the Noble Lord had so zealously endeavoured to erect, for the protection of our decayed election rights, that it was almost reasonable to presume, that the Noble Lord might have entered into a serious compact with a Noble Duke, his former Ally, on this subject, for reciprocal assistance, on their two favourite objects; by which the Noble Lord was peremptorily to support the plan of fortifying the Dock Yards in that House, or the Noble Duke would no longer engage to assist him in fortifying the constitution in the other.—

But what was the Noble Lord's argument? he had rested the matter entirely upon the ground taken by his Right Hon. Friend, (Mr. Pitt.) that the pursuing this system of fortification would actually diminish the standing army in this country, and that the *number* of troops being so diminished, there would be proportionally less cause for that constitutional jealousy, with which all parties agreed, it was our duty to regard the encreasing military power of the Crown. That this system of defence by Fortifications, could under any circumstances have the effect of reducing the standing army, Mr. Sheridan utterly denied; some plausible arguments indeed had been adduced in support of this notion, which, however, when sifted, would be found fallacious and contradictory; for the present, however, he would wave that point, and admit implicitly, that the standing army of the country would be reduced by the measure proposed precisely in the proportion stated by the Noble Lord; it then, however, remained to be proved, that giving the Noble Lord his premises, he was right in his conclusion. When we talked of a *constitutional* jealousy of the military power of the Crown, what was the real object to which we pointed our suspicion? what was the *datum*, as the fashionable phrase was, upon which they proceeded?

proceeded? what!—but that it was in the nature of Kings to love power, and in the constitution of armies, to obey Kings. This was delicate ground he knew to touch upon, but the circumstances of the question that day, called for plain dealing; he could not be suspected in the smallest degree of alluding to the present Monarch on the Throne, or to the army under his command; he agreed most sincerely to the distinctions taken with respect to both by a worthy Baronet who had spoken before him; but at the same time, it must be admitted, that whenever we spoke of a constitutional jealousy of the army, it was upon a supposition, that the unhappy time *might* come, when a Prince misled by evil Counsellors, and against the suggestions of his own gracious temper of course, might cherish the disastrous notion, that he could become greater by making his subjects less, and that an army might be found so forgetful of their duty as citizens, so warped by feelings of false honour, or so degraded by habits of implicit obedience, as to support their military head, in an attempt upon the rights and liberties of their country! The possible existence of this case, and the probable coincidence of these circumstances, was that to which every gentleman's mind must point when he admitted an argument upon the subject, otherwise, we burlesqued and derided the wisdom of our ancestors, with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, and made a mere mockery of the salutary and sacred reserve, with which, for a short and limited period, we annually intrusted the executive magistrate with the necessary defence of the country. This plain statement being really the case, to what in such a crisis were we to look? were our apprehensions only to be directed to the length of the muster roll of men in the King's pay? Were we to calculate only the number of soldiers he could encamp at Hounslow, or the force of the detachment he might spare to surround the lobby of the House of Commons?—No—the jet and substance of the question lay briefly here; In which of the two situations now argued upon, would the King and his evil advisers find themselves in a state of the greatest military force and preparation,

paration, and most likely to command and to receive a military support? In this point of view would it be argued, that these fortresses, which were to be capable of resisting the siege of a foreign enemy landed in force, would be strength in the hands of the Crown, when the enemy was his people? Would no stress be given to the great and important distinction, already ably urged between troops elected and separated from their fellow citizens in garrisons and forts, and men living scattered and entangled in all the common duties and connections of their countrymen? Was this an argument of no weight when applied to the *Militia*, who were to form a part of these garrisons? or would it for a moment be pretended that men under such circumstances, and in such disciplined habits, were not a thousand times more likely to despise the breath of Parliament, and to lend themselves to the active purposes of tyranny and ambition, than the loose and unconnected bodies, which exist even with jealousy under the present system? It was unnecessary to press the distinction, the fact was, that these strong military holds, if maintained as they must be in peace, by full and disciplined garrisons; if well provided, and calculated to stand regular sieges, as the present plan professed, and if extended to all the objects to which the system must inevitably lead, whether they were to be considered as inducements to tempt a weak Prince to evil views, or as engines of power in case of an actual rupture, would in truth, promise tenfold the means of curbing and subduing the country, than could be stated to arise even from doubling the present military establishment, with this extraordinary aggravation, attending the folly of consenting to such a system, that those very naval stores and magazines, the seed and sources of our future navies, the effectual preservation of which, was the pretence for these unassailable fortresses, would in that case become a pledge and hostage in the hands of the Crown, which in a country circumstanced as this was, must insure an unconditional submission to the most extravagant claims which despotism could dictate.

After pressing this still more forcibly, Mr. Sheridan resumed the concession he had made, and argued on the fallacy of holding out expectations, that a system of de-

sence by fortifications, could in fact end in a retrenchment of the standing army; the first fallacy in this argument, was, he said, the supposition that the system of defence by fortifications, was necessarily to stop when Portsmouth and Plymouth were secured, and that the reasoning upon which the extensive works for those places were justified, would not apply to any other parts of the kingdom, however their importance called for defence, or their situation exposed them to attack. The shortest method of refuting this idea, was simply to suppose the same Board of Officers, acting under the same instructions, and deliberating under the same *data*, going a circuit round the coast of the kingdom, and called upon to report upon the various places in their progress, and let any person fairly consider the suppositions under which they make their present Report, and then hesitate to confess, that they must of necessity recommend a similar plan of defence proportioned to the importance of every place, to which their attention was directed. It was unnecessary to dwell on the circumstances which no longer permitted us to consider Holland in future otherwise than as a province of France, or which rendered it equally reasonable to look with an eye of apprehension to the neighbouring coast belonging to the Emperor, the fact was evident, that in the case of this country being engaged in a war against a powerful Confederacy, upon the supposition of which alone the present scheme was recommended and justified, every motive of prudence must compel us to direct an attention, as vigorous and vigilant to the East coast of this country, as to the South. On this idea Mr. Sheridan enumerated various places, which with Chatham and Sheerness, where most extensive lines had actually been begun under the auspices of the noble Duke, must necessarily be provided for in the new system of protection, and called upon any person to compute the stationary defence necessary for such places, in addition to the 22,000 men demanded for Portsmouth and Plymouth, and allow for any moving force in the country besides, and then decide what chance there was that this prolific system would terminate in a reduction of the standing army!

With regard to the probability of our being able to furnish

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furnish men for the constant maintenance of these garrisons, the argument had been, not a reference to our present peace establishment, but to the extent of the service in the most extravagant periods of the last war; which in other words was to hold out a notion, that we might speedily again look to a time when we should be able to expend for the purpose of war *fifteen millions* of money in a single year!—at the very moment that the Right Hon. Gentleman was holding out the reduction of our debt by a few hundred thousand pounds, as the triumph of his administration, and the corner stone of that pillar upon which his fame was to be emblazoned! But even supposing this to be possible, and the reference to our establishment in the last war to be just, the Right Hon. Gentleman had taken an unfair advantage of the argument; for when he stated the numerous armies which we had upon the continent of America, as resources from which we were in future to garrison these forts, and increase our home defence, he ought also to have taken into his account the enormous floating establishment which attended upon those armies, and which being converted into an efficient naval defence at home, would make both his fortifications and his garrisons unnecessary.

Mr. Sheridan next took notice of the attack made by Mr. Pitt on the late Administration. In whatever point of view he was that day to regard the Right Hon. Gentleman; whether as that glorious orb which an Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Luttrell) had described him to be, whose influence and power was more than to compensate to the nation for the loss of an hemisphere; or whether his lustre was calculated rather to dazzle and surprise, than to cherish and invigorate; whether he merited the less complimentary language of a Right Hon. Friend of his (Col. Barré) who had said that *his conscience had been surprized in this business*; or whether it had capitulated upon regular approaches; whether he had been successful in repelling the insinuation of another Gentleman that he was not *in earnest* in this cause, by the vehemence of his manner, or had confirmed it by the weakness of his argument; whether the Right Hon. Gentleman most deserved the praises or reproach he had that day received, he would not embarrass himself with discussing.

cussing, but one part of his conduct there was, which he was astonished had escaped the panegyric of his Friends,—He meant the spirit and enterprize with which, taking his hint probably from the subject in debate, he had endeavoured to carry the war into the enemy's country, and pursue measures of offence and attack, while at home was exposed defenceless and unfortified.

For what was the ground of this strenuous charge? The late Administration the Right Hon. Gentleman asserted, had submitted part of this very plan to the judgment of Parliament; but at the desire of the House had withdrawn that part for *reconsideration*; and now, if upon reconsideration, they had in any respect altered their opinion, it was the grossest inconsistency of conduct and dereliction of principle!—an extraordinary charge, and particularly so from the Gentleman by whom it was urged! He had *reconsidered* many subjects, without aspiring to the merit of an obstinate adherence to his first opinion. He had *reconsidered* his American Intercourse Bill, and had publicly avowed that he had parted with every idea that he had once held on that subject. He had *reconsidered* his India Bill, and before it was ingrossed had scarcely suffered one word to remain which belonged to it, when it was brought in. He had *reconsidered* his Irish resolutions in every part, provision, and principle; having first offered them as a bounty to Ireland, he had *reconsidered* the boon, and annexed a price to it, and then *reconsidered* his *reconsideration*, and abandoned his own indispensable condition! And yet this Minister, whose whole government had been one continued series of rash proposition, and ungraceful concession, held it out as a palpable enormity in others, that reconsideration should have produced alteration of sentiment, and that too, upon a subject where the first opinion must have been taken upon credit, and the second was called for upon minute information and authentic enquiry. Having pressed this very forcibly, and applied the argument to many gentlemen round the Minister, who had formerly given a decided opinion against the Fortifications, but were then supposed to be inclined to favour them, Mr. Sheridan proceeded to a more detailed defence of the conduct of the late Administration, in which he proved, referring to the estimates and journals of 1783, that they had not the

the least occasion to resort to the justification of having changed their minds in consequence of better information ; for that the fact was, that they never had, in the slightest degree, committed themselves in any opinion or approbation whatever of the present plan.

With regard to the history of the rise and progress of Fortifications in this island, upon which the Right Hon. Gentleman had laid so much stress, as if he had proved, that that, which was not new, must be constitutional, and that that which had been often tried, must be fit to be done ; he maintained, that every word urged on this subject made against the cause it was brought to support ; for experience, even by their own statement, had taught us nothing but that the nation had invariably been deluded and defrauded upon this unprincipled plea of Fortifications ; that much had been done and undone, many schemes and many projectors tried ; many millions spent, and the object avowedly as distant as ever ! So that repeated proofs of past deception were all they urged as arguments for present confidence, and it was modestly expected, they should believe that because a point had been always unsuccessfully attempted, it was now at last certain of being wisely accomplished.

Mr. Sheridan went through a variety of other matters, replying to several arguments of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and of Capt. Luttrell, in the course of which he was interrupted by both the Hon. Members, who restated their arguments which were still combated by Mr. Sheridan. He also took notice of a charge of inconsistency which had been eagerly dwelt upon by the Chancellor of the Exchequer against Capt. Macbride, and which, though the Hon. Captain had omitted to reply to, had no other foundation than the Right Hon. Gentleman having thought proper to confound the opinion of the *land* officers with that of the *sea* officers, as Mr. S. fairly proved.

Mr. Sheridan, at this period of his speech averted to the *Report* itself. He admitted that those who had entrenched themselves in constitutional objections only, refusing to be bound by the advice and authority of any Board of General Officers or Engineers whatever upon such a subject, had taken strong and respectable ground ; those also who had argued the subject more
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with a reference to the state of the revenue of the country, and had seemed to consider the measure as advisable, or otherwise, according as it should be found consistent with the necessary principles of œconomy, were undoubtedly entitled to every attention. For his own part, however, he did not go to the extreme of the reasoning used on either of these topics—every hour produced instances where practices highly dangerous by their precedent, and evidently infringing on the established rights of the subject, were resorted to, unavoidably perhaps, for the purpose of retrieving and maintaining that public credit, without which the affairs of this country were completely desperate. The Right Hon. Gentleman had pledged himself not to press this business, unless he could make it appear to be a measure not less essential to national safety, than even the preservation of public credit itself. Upon this line of argument, the dangers to be apprehended to the constitution, which were stated to be eventual and remote, must of course give way, and the point of œconomy was wholly out of the question. The Right Hon. Gentleman had also stated, that the decision of a Board specially appointed for this enquiry, and consisting of persons eminently qualified for the judgment required from them, was the best authority which the country could obtain on the subject, and afforded a better guide for the opinion and conduct of that House, than the arguments or information of its individual members could supply. To this he had already assented, and now repeated his assent; nor did he hesitate to renew the pledge the Right Hon. Gentleman had appeared so anxious to fix him to, that he, for his own part, mindful of the terms upon which the question was suspended at the close of the last Session was content to abide by the decision of a Board so described, and to withdraw his objections to the plan, if it could be fairly made to appear that these gentlemen, whose names and characters he freely admitted did entitle them to the confidence which was claimed for them, had upon a full investigation of the whole of the subject proposed last year in Parliament to be submitted to their enquiry, and being left to their own free and unfettered judgment in forming their decision—had reported as their decided and unqualified opinion, that the plan proposed by the Noble Duke, and then under discussion, was a measure which it be-
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come the wisdom and prudence of Parliament to adopt. Upon this point they were at issue, and the Report in his hand was the only authority to which he should appeal, and the sole ground upon which he should argue.

Before, however, he entered into a discussion of the matter of the Report, he could not omit to take notice of many circumstances attending the manner of its formation. Upon these Mr. Sheridan, without reflecting upon the officers who composed the Board, commented with great severity; particularly supporting the complaint which had been urged by the first suggester of this reference (Colonel Barré) that in violation of the confidence reposed in Ministers, they had not referred the question of a system for the general defence of the country, to the Board, giving them due time and materials for forming their opinion upon the great and extensive subject, but had merely required from them a short answer relative to two points of attack under certain *data* of their own imposing.

The appointment of the Noble Duke to be President of the Board had been before enlarged upon, and Mr. Sheridan made use of many additional arguments to enforce the impropriety of that nomination. Other Gentlemen had alluded, he observed, to peculiar circumstances of the Noble Duke's personal character; he had been described as a man *who had been never known to give up point*; whether this was the case or not, or whether there was some principles of publick profession, which the Noble Duke had not very rigorously adhered to, he would not pretend to decide, as he might be suspected of speaking from party prejudices: there was one characteristic, however, of the Noble Duke's mind, which he thought might be fairly alluded to, as it was a peculiarity which had been publickly brought forward in argument by a high authority in that house; and, if now referring to it, he were to represent that noble personage as of a temper eager to extravagance and vehement in the extreme if he were to describe him as a person who, having taken up a just principle, was capable of defeating all salutary proceeding upon it, by driving on with a heated imagination to the most flighty and preposterous conclusions, the Right Hon. Gentleman opposite to him (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) would be his authority. *He was the person who had lessened*

lenced him, and the House, into that opinion, as must be in the recollection of every gentleman, who in a former session heard that [Right Hon. Gentleman] discuss the Noble Duke's principles of Parliamentary Reform, and recollected the terms of indignant ridicule, with which he had cautioned them against the schemes of so wild and visionary a projector. If, therefore, he was arraigned for following any plan of the Noble Duke's with a peculiar degree of jealousy, he should leave his justification in the abler hands of the Right Hon. Gentleman.

Mr. S. now brought himself to the ground upon which he was principally pledged,—the *authority* to be derived from the *Board of Enquiry*. But before he began this discussion, he ironically, complimented the Noble Duke on the striking proof of his genius as an *engineer*, which appeared even in the planning and constructing of the paper in his hand. The professional ability of the Master General shone as conspicuously there, as it could upon our coasts. He had made it, he said, an *argument, of posts*, and conducted his reasoning upon principles of trigonometry as well as logick. There were certain detached data, like advanced works, to keep the enemy at a distance from the main object in debate. Strong provisions covered the flanks of his assertions. His very queries were in casemates. No impression, therefore, was to be made on this fortress of sophistry, by desultory observations, it was necessary to sit down before it, and assail it by regular approaches; it was fortunate, however, to observe, that notwithstanding all the skill employed by the Noble and Literary Engineer, his mode of defence on paper was open to the same objection which had been urged against his other fortifications; that if his adversary got possession of one of his posts, it became strength against him, and the means of subduing the whole line of his argument. Having very successfully illustrated this by some instances, Mr. S. proceeded to a minute and detailed investigation of every part of the Report.

(Here it is utterly out of our power to follow the Hon. Member, nor could our readers, unless they had the Report of the Board of Officers in their hands to turn to the various parts quoted and contrasted, enter into the spirit or merit of the discussion; we shall only observe, that by dispersing many strokes of ridicule and pleasantry in the course of it, he rivetted the attention of the House to what must otherwise have been,

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however shrewdly managed, a very dry investigation, and we are free to confess that Mr. Sheridan did appear to us to make out to the entire conviction of the House the three substantial points he laboured to establish from the Report.)

The points which Mr. Sheridan contended he had distinctly established from the authentic document before the House, notwithstanding the mutilated state in which it appeared, were—*first*, that not one word, hint, or suggestion on the part of the *naval* officers tending to give any approbation either directly or by implication, to the scheme of fortification then in debate, was to be found in that paper, but that on the contrary, from the manner in which a reference was made to the *minutes* of the Naval Officers, of which the result was withheld a strong presumption might be grounded, wholly independent of information the House had received from Members of that board, that those minutes did contain a condemnation of the plan. He did not expect to hear it argued that the result of those minutes could not be communicated, because they were mixed with dangerous matters of intelligence; they had shewn a sufficient degree of ingenuity in the manner they had extracted them from the Report; and it would be extraordinary indeed that wherever the judgment was *unfavourable*, it should have been so blended and complicated with matters of detail and dangerous discussion, that no chimecal process in the Ordnance laboratory could possibly separate them, while, on the contrary, every *approving* opinion, like a light subtile oily fluid, floated at top at once, and the clumsiest clerk was capable of presenting it to the house pure and untinged by a single particle of the argument or information upon which it was produced.

His *second* point was, that the opinion given by the *land* Officers in favour of the plan, was hypothetical and conditional: and that they had unanimously and invariably throughout the whole business, refused to lend their authority to, or to make themselves responsible for the *data* or suppositions upon which that opinion was to be maintained. This Mr. Sheridan dwelt upon for a considerable time, as so much stress had been laid upon this circumstance, and the Report had been so artfully managed, as in many points to appear to support the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the contrary assertion.

The *third* point was, that the *data* themselves were founded on a supposition of events, so improbable and desperate, that the existence of the case contained in them, carried with it not the imminent danger of Portsmouth and Plymouth only, but the actual conquest of the Island. Upon this Mr. Sheridan reasoned concisely, much detail of argument was not necessary, after he had unanswerably established that the case alluded to in the words often recurred to "*under the circumstance of the data.*" was literally this, "the absence of the *whole* British fleet for the space of *three* months, while an army of *thirty* or *forty* thousand men was ready on the enemy's coast to invade this country, that enemy to chuse their point of landing, to land and encamp with heavy artillery, and every necessary for a siege while no force in Great-Britain was to be collected in less than *two* months to oppose them." Having pressed this to the utmost, he then denied, that even taking it for granted that the enemy *should* decide to assault no part but Portsmouth and Plymouth, that politely hostile he should scorn to strike a blow at the heart of the empire, but in the courtly spirit of a French Duellist, should aim only to wound in the sword-arm; that even then he denied that these *only* objects provided for, could be said to be *effectually* secured. For first, it was not made out, that the enemy might not land or march to the eastward of Plymouth where no defence was pretended; and secondly, the whole question turning upon a supposition of our being inferior at sea, in that case a presumption of the safe return of the inferior fleet and its beating the superior fleet, was the sole resource for the relief of the besieged dock yards, whose defence was expressly stated in the Report, to be calculated only as *against the force, and for the time* expressed in the *data*; so that the enemy having it obviously in his power while master of the sea, to recruit his own army, as well as to keep the other exposed parts of this kingdom in check and alarm, and thereby to prevent the possibility of our assembling and uniting a force sufficient to raise the siege, it followed that if either the enemy's army exceeded the number supposed, or that the time was prolonged beyond the period calculated, the whole of this *effectual* security vanished under their own reasoning, and we should merely have prepared a strong hold in the country for our foe, a hold which the circumstances under which he was supposed

posed to make the attack, would enable him for ever to retain.

Having summed up the general heads of his arguments, Mr. Sheridan concluded with some observations on the distinction which had that day been taken relative to the different persons who were supposed to form the opposition to the present plan. He had heard the old insinuations of *party views* resorted to by those who defended the original motion; and some gentlemen who had most strenuously opposed it, had, however, in a kind of language, which he could not avoid taking notice of, disavowed any party feeling or connection with the party alluded to. For his own part, he was happy that the business had worn so little the appearance of party as it had; and though he had moved for and obtained the report, which had been so much discussed, and upon which so much had turned, he had been ready and anxious as the persons alluded to knew, to resign the business into the hands of the respectable Gentlemen who had that day so ably brought it forward. He could never, however for one, submit to the imputation that the party, with whom he had the honour to act, were supporting or opposing any measure, upon motives less just, less fair, or less honourable, than those which influenced any other description of Gentlemen in that House. The present question could not even be pretended to be pursued with *party policy*, as there was not a person in the House, that must not acknowledge that party purpose, would be better gratified by entangling the Right Hon. Gentleman in the pursuit of this obnoxious and unpopular scheme;—but the Gentlemen who had that day led the opposition to it, had been so wished to take that lead, because it appeared among the most effectual means of warding off an injury from the country; otherwise to be enlisting under leaders for the day, or courting the temporary assistance of any description of Gentlemen, would in his opinion be a conduct as impolitick as undignified. On the other hand, to recede from any important contest, because Gentlemen unconnected with them were likely to have the credit of the event, would deservedly cast on them the reproach of being a faction and not a party. But this was not their conduct—they could defend their situation upon system and principle; however reduced their ranks, they were more desirous to prove they were in the right than

than to increase their numbers. He was confident, however, the Gentlemen he might be supposed to allude to, were too liberal to set a less value on their support that day because it was unaccompanied by addulation, or any endeavour to canvass for their future connection. Let us, said Mr. Sheridan, this night be firmly embodied in a cause we equally approve. Let us do this great service to the country; then separate, and seek opposing camps. Let them return with the double triumph, if they will, of having conferred an important benefit on their constituents and the nation, and a real obligation on the Government. Let them have the credit with the country of having defeated the Minister's measure, and the merit with his friends, of having rescued *him* from a perilous dilemma. Leave us only the silent satisfaction, that without envying the reputation of those we were content to follow, without being piqued by insinuations against our motives, and without debating whether the Minister might not be served by our success, we gave an earnest and zealous assistance in defeating a measure, which under the specious pretence of securing our coasts, strikes at the root of our great national defence, and at the heart of the constitution itself.

Mr. Fox said, his Hon. Friend had gone so fully into the whole of the subject, and had argued it so closely, that it was unnecessary for him to take up much of the time of the House. He would therefore speak only to a few points, so personal to himself, that the House he conceived would think it highly necessary for him to take some notice of them. The Right Hon. Gentleman, he observed, had pretty strongly insinuated, that the system of Fortification now in contemplation, was a part of that identical system that he (Mr. Fox) had when in office proposed to the House. This was not by any means a correct representation of the fact, for in truth he never had proposed any plan of Fortification whatever, but in the Ordnance Estimates of the year 1783, a specific sum was asked for the purpose of going on with Fort Monkton, and another small fort which had been begun; but a demur arising upon the subject, he had agreed in the Committee to take the two charges out of the Estimate and reserve them for future consideration, and the remaining part of the Estimate was voted without them. Mr. Fox concurred in opinion with great part of Colonel Barré's argument, declaring that the Right Hon. Gentle-

Gentleman had well said, that it was not by fortifying Portsmouth and Plymouth merely, that we were to look for a defence of the kingdom from invasion or from dangerous attacks; undoubtedly there were other vulnerable parts of our coast, that required attention as well as those proposed to be fortified. He took notice of what had fallen from Mr. Pitt on the subject of the peace, and of the manner in which Colonel Barré had taken offence at it. He denied that it had been either a *necessary*, or a *great and glorious* Peace, declaring, that in the relative state of this kingdom at the time, compared with the state of other powers, we had a right to expect a much more advantageous treaty. If, however, it had been great and glorious, those who had been in office and had a share in making it, had divided the rewards of it in a manner singularly striking. For themselves they had taken places and emoluments, and left the person, who was supposed to have been the principal negotiator of it in full possession of all the encomiums that the warmest of his panegyrists could bestow.

But "ease and praise, said Mr. Fox, are the true objects of genuine ambition. These they liberally bestowed on the noble Lord (Lansdown) these substantial recompences, these solid honours, have they nobly secured to him, in his favourite retirement, in his sequestered happiness, in rustic peace, and undisturbed repose! For themselves, on the contrary, have they not reserved all the cares, the anxieties, the fatigues, the sollicitations, and the emoluments of office? Generous partition!—substantial fame for their patron, mere official reward for themselves!" 'Tis the extreme of absurdity to suppose on party considerations the carrying the proposed amendment, can be an object of the slightest estimation. Who is there imagines that I or my friends shall be one step nearer the acquisition of office or of power, whether the Duke of Richmond's Fortification plan succeeds or fails? If defeating the Minister, even in points which he has unequivocally supported to the utmost of his power, could have served us in a party light, how came it, that notwithstanding the numerous defeats he has endured, he continues unshaken, or even more firm than ever? Has the whole failure of the Irish Propositions in the least affected him as a Minister? Did his shameful defeat in the question of the Westminster scrutiny either prejudice him, or serve me, in a ministerial light?

light? Did his abandonment of the Manchester Tax take an atom from his consequence? The fact is, he is a Minister who thrives by defeat, and flourishes by disappointment. The country gentlemen oppose him on one occasion, only to give him more strength on another; he is beat by them on one subject only to be assisted by them in a succeeding one; if he falls by the landed interest to-day he is sure to rise by them to-morrow with added energy and recruited vigour."

Mr. Fox pursued this animated strain for some time. He then reminded the House, that the Right Hon. Gentleman had, as usual, had recourse to his *machinery* in his opening speech. He had drawn into his argument the American war, and the coalition. He was a little surprised, that the poor India Bill had escaped. Those topics however the Right Hon. Gentleman might bring forward as often as he thought proper. No part of his conduct was he ashamed of, and though clamour artfully raised, and industriously kept alive, might for a while put a false and injurious construction upon it, time would dissipate the cloud of prejudice, and convince all men how egregiously they had been duped, and deluded. Before he closed his speech he avowed, that he retained, all his great party principles on constitutional questions; and that it was that circumstance that formed the line between him and the Right Hon. Gentleman. "I stand, says he, on this great principle. I say the people of England have a right to controul the executive power, by the interference of their representatives in this House of Parliament. The Right Hon. Gentleman maintains the contrary. He is the cause of our political enmity; to this I adhere; to this I pledge myself, and on this ground, I mean to vote for the amendment."

Lord North argued against the proposed system on the grounds of policy and œconomy. If every Master General of the Ordnance was to be indulged in constructing such plans of Fortification as his caprice approved, there would, his Lordship said, be no end to the expence. What was begun by one Board of Ordnance would be pulled down by another, and new works erected, which would again be pulled down by the next. It was therefore highly necessary to come to some determination on the subject, and not continue to proceed up-

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on so unsettled, so various and so expensive a system. Lord North took notice of the allusion that had been made to Lord Sandwich by Captain Berkeley, who had talked of the *curfed* management of the Navy during the late war, and said, though the American War was by no means a subject that came within the purview of the original motion, or of the amendment, he should not have the smallest objection to meet the Hon. Gentleman on that topick, whenever he thought proper to bring it forward; when he did so, however he might differ from the opinion; of many gentlemen on the other side of the House, (from some he saw opposite to him, he believed he should not differ widely); and however he might even differ from his Right Hon. Friend, and many Hon. Gentlemen who sat near him, he should contend and maintain that no fault had been imputable to any misconduct, or mismanagement of his Noble Friend, who at that time sat at the head of the Admiralty Board, but that every ill success had arisen from the nature of the war, from the necessary division of our marine force; and from the powerful combination of maritime strength with which Great Britain had to contend. His Lordship concluded with declaring that he should vote for the amendment.

Mr. Dundas replied to Lord North, and said, it was with a view to meet the objections started by the Noble Lord, that the system of Fortifications then under consideration had been proposed. It was by that House's laying down a regular and permanent system that should be abided by, that an end would be put to the expensive practice that had prevailed of indulging one Master General of the Ordnance with this plan, and another General with that, and so on, pulling down and abandoning as fast as Fortifications were erected. Mr. Dundas strenuously recommended the proposed system on the same grounds of argument as had been enforced with so much eloquence by his Right Hon. Friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and said, a mode of defence that would give security to our Dock Yards, and preserve the vital sources of our Navy, from the danger of being destroyed during any future war, was an object in his mind of so much value and importance, that 700,000l, or even a million of money, as some gentlemen had stated it, would
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be a cheap price to pay for the purchase. The question was, would the House go to that expence for the attainment of an object so immediatly connected with the future existence of our Navy, or not? To such a question he should not imagine any man in his senses, who was not mislead by prejudice could hesitate a moment to repeal in the affirmative. He relied a good deal on the opinion of the Board of Officers, who, he contended, had delivered it as their *unanimous* opinion, not only that such a system of Fortifications was absolutely necessary, but that it was that particular plan that could be erected at the smallest expence, and would require the fewest soldiers to man.

Mr. Wyndham said, Mr. Dundas had argued the question fairly, and that he was the only Speaker in favour of the proposed system, that had put it on its right ground. The question shortly was this: Here is a plan of Fortification proposed, and it will cost 700,000l.—will the House, or will it not agree to pay that price for it? Mr. Wyndham having so stated the matter in issue, between the two sides of the House, proceeded to prove by argument, that the House would act unwisely and imprudently, if they accepted the bargain, on the terms proposed. He reasoned against Fortifications in general as an insecure and dangerous means of defence, and as that of all others the most unfit for us to adopt, *Spem pro pretio emere, ridiculum est*, was he said, an established maxim, but *mentum et periculum pro pretio emere, ridiculum est*, was still more undeniable, and therefore he should vote for the amendment, on the ground that to pay 700,000l. for Fortifications, would be to lavish so much of the publick mony, for the purchase of alarm and danger.

Mr. H. Phipps, Mr. Wilberforce, and Mr. Martin laid in their claim to be heard another opportunity, the two former professed themselves warm friends to the motion; the latter declared that nothing the Right Hon. Gentleman had said, had convinced him that the Fortifications proposed ought to be adopted in preference to the encouragement of our Navy.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer apologized for desiring to be heard again, after having taken up so much time

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time of the House, but presumed the House, late as it was in the morning, would not refuse their wonted indulgence, especially after they had heard so much, that made a reply from him indispensibly necessary. He then, with great rapidity and equal energy of argument, went over the several heads of objections that had been urged to the motion, and contended that the question was clearly a naval question, and that it had been made appear, in his mind unanswerably, that if the plan were adopted, a smaller army establishment would be necessary, than had hitherto been kept up. He paid Mr Sheridan's speech particular attention, calling, it, (as indeed it well deserved to be called,) a most able and ingenious argument, and applying much, of what he said, to do away the impression that Gentleman's reasoning must have made. He met the suggestions of the Member for Hereford, and of Colonel Barré, (that his heart was not with the business, and that he was not sincere in his good wishes towards it) with a degree of indignation, the infallible evidence of innocence. He said, the first Gentleman as a new Member, and evidently not much used to public speaking, was excusable for having mentioned the report he had heard, but that report was wholly ill-founded; he was, however, greatly hurt at hearing such a report hazarded within those walls, and he had been still more astonished, when he heard something fall from a Right Hon. Gentleman, whose infirmity he was extremely concerned had forced him to withdraw, that looked like an insinuation darkly wrapped up, under the words, *that his conscience had been surprized*, which seemed to have been directly aimed at the same end. He had only to say, that he considered both the one and the other, if the meaning he had assumed, really belonged to them, as founded in the blackest malignity and as highly injurious to his character. The Chancellor ended with repeating his assurances, that the proposed plan was intimately connected with the future well-fare and prosperity of the Navy; and that unless some such plan was soon adopted, the country and that House would have to lament, and to blame themselves for having rejected a measure so much to the national advantage, and on which the preservation of their liberties, and of the constitution itself depended!

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The Gallery was cleared at seven this morning, and the House immediately divided on the Motion, "that, the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question."

TELLERS.

For the *Ayes*.
Mr. Steel.
Mr. M. A. Taylor.

Ayes 169.

For the *Noes*.
Lord Maitland.
Captain Macbride.

Noes 169.

The numbers being equal, Mr. Speaker declared the *Noes* had it.

The House then adjourned, it being twenty minutes past Seven.

APPEN.

APPENDIX.

COPY OF A LETTER

FROM

The Right Hon. Lord SYDNEY,

TO

His Grace the Duke of *Richmond* ~~HAMILTON~~,

Appointing His Grace President of the BOARD of Land
and Sea Officers.

ALSO,

A COPY OF A CIRCULAR LETTER

From the Right Honourable Lord SYDNEY to the Land
Officers, and from Mr. STEPHENS, to the Naval Of-
ficers, appointed Members of the said Board.

WITH

EXTRACTS

From the INSTRUCTIONS to the Duke of Rich-
mond, President of the said Board.

AND

From the REPORT made to His MAJESTY by the said
Board.

A. P. E. N. D. I. X.

THE END OF THE WORLD

A COPY OF A CIRCULAR LETTER

BY THE A. C. T. S.

THE A. C. T. S. OF THE A. C. T. S.

MY LORD,

Whitehall, 8th April, 1785.

I HAVE the Honor to transmit to your Grace a Copy of a Circular Letter written to the several Officers named *, who, together with naval Officers, have been appointed, by the King's command, to compose a Board for investigating, and reporting to his Majesty on the proper system of defence, and the expediency and efficacy of the plans which have been proposed for better securing his Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth; and his Majesty having thought proper to appoint your Grace to be President of the said Board, I am to signify to you his Royal commands, that you do hold yourself in readiness for this service; and am to acquaint your Grace, that his Majesty's instructions will be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

I have the Honor to be,

My Lord,

Your Grace's

most obedient

humble Servant,

SYDNEY.

His Grace the Duke of Richmond,
&c. &c. &c.

CIRCU-

* Gen. Duke of Richmond, Gen. Conway, Gen. L. Amherst, Gen. L. Townshend, Lt. Gen. Sir G. Carleton, Lt. Gen. Sir W. Draper, Lt. Gen. Sir W. Howe, Lt. Gen. L. G. Lennox, Lt. Gen. Sir R. Boyd, Lt. Gen. Burgoyne, Lt. Gen. Earl Percy, Lt. Gen. Earl Cornwallis, Lt. Gen. Sir D. Lindsay, Lt. Gen. Sir C. Grey, M. Gen. Pattison, M. Gen. Claveland, M. Gen. Bramham, M. Gen. Green, M. Gen. Roy, M. Gen. Gard, M. Gen. A. Campbell.

C I R C U L A R L E T T E R

(C O P Y)

Whitehall, 8th April 1785.

MY LORD, or SIR,

HIS Majesty having judged it of the utmost importance, that the most effectual means should be provided in time of peace, for rendering his Majesty's principal Dock Yards as secure as possible against any attempt upon them that may be expected in a future war, plans of permanent works for this purpose, for Portsmouth and Plymouth, have, by the King's commands, been laid before his Majesty by the Master General of the Ordnance. But in a work of such magnitude and expence, so necessarily connected with the general system of defence for the kingdom, his Majesty, desirous of having the opinion of a Board composed of land and sea Officers of experience and abilities, who should fully investigate the subject on the spot, has been pleased to appoint the Officers before mentioned, together with naval Officers, who will receive their instructions from the Admiralty, to be Members of this Board, for investigating and reporting to his Majesty on the proper system of defence, and the expediency and efficacy of the proposed plans for the better securing his Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth.

And as the object of this Enquiry peculiarly belongs to the office of the Master General of the Ordnance, his Majesty has been pleased to direct, that the Duke of Richmond shall be President of this Board.

His Grace is to give notice to the Members of the time and place where they are to assemble, and is to appoint some intelligent Officer to act as Secretary.

His Majesty, confiding in your zeal and talents for this service, has been pleased to appoint you a Member of this Board; I am therefore commanded by his Majesty to direct you to hold yourself in readiness for this service.

His

His Majesty's instructions for your proceedings will be transmitted to the President. His Majesty has been pleased to direct, that an allowance of 40*s.* per day shall be made to you, and to each of the land Officers, Members of this Board, during the time you shall be employed on this service, and 20*s.* per day to the Secretary; as likewise an allowance of 2*s.* per mile to each Member, and 1*s.* 2*d.* per mile to the Secretary, for such journeys as they may actually take in consequence of this order.

I have the Honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble Servant,

SYDNEY.

Admiralty Office, 14th April 1785.

SIR,

THE King having been pleased to direct, that a Board of sea and land Officers should be forthwith appointed (whereat the Duke of Richmond, Master General of the Ordnance, is to preside) for investigating the proper system of defence, and reporting upon the expediency and efficacy of the plans which have been prepared for the better security of his Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth, for his Majesty's information: And the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having in consequence judged fit that you, together with the several Flag Officers and Captains of the Fleet*, who have been duly apprized of their Lordships intentions herein, should be selected for the sea Officers, whereof that part of the Board to be assembled at Portsmouth, for such special purpose, is to be composed: I am therefore directed to signify their Lordships desire, that

* Admiral Pigot, V. Ad. Barrington, R. Ad. Lord Hood, Captains Hotham, Sir J. Jarvis, Bowyer, Macbride, Sir A. Hammond, Jas. Luttrell.

that you will hold yourself in readiness to attend the Duke of Richmond, and other Members of the Board, at Portsmouth, when so required by his Grace, for the discussion of any maritime propositions incidental to this appointment; and to communicate your opinions, how far the same may appear more or less eligible to be adopted for the benefit of his Majesty's service; and otherwise to proceed in the premises as required by the King's instructions given to the Duke of Richmond, for his Majesty's information, accordingly.

But whereas some previous and more particular inspection of the coast and shores, to which the Enquirers addressed to you and the other naval Officers of the Board relate, may be necessary in the progress of your deliberations, you are permitted to take to your assistance therein such Captains of the guard ships, naval officers, pilots, or other resident persons having knowledge of the navigation of the ports and parts of the adjacent coasts and shores to be examined, as you shall think proper.

After the necessary enquiries have been terminated at Portsmouth, where your stay will be requisite for carrying on the service of the port, Admiral Pigot will be to proceed with the Board, as senior Officer in the Naval Branch, on the similar investigation of the system of defence proposed for the Dock Yard at Plymouth.

And I am further to inform you, that you and the other naval Officers of the Board will be paid, for your travelling charges and subsistence, while you are employed on this service, such allowance, out of the contingencies of the Ordnance, as is to be made, by his Majesty's commands, to the respective Officers of his land forces, nominated for the same occasion.

I am, Sir,

your most obedient

humble Servant,

PH^e STEPHENS.

N. B. Admirals Montagu and Pigot being excused from the above service, on account of their indisposition, Vice Admiral Barrington was directed to proceed upon it in their stead, as senior Officer in the Naval Branch.

I N S T R U C T I O N S.

G E O R G E R.

INSTRUCTIONS for Our Right Trusty and Right Entirely Beloved Cousin and Counselor Charles Duke of Richmond, Lenox, and Aubigny, Master General of Our Ordnance, whom We have thought fit shall be President of a Board of Land and Sea Officers, appointed under Our Royal Authority, to investigate, and report to Us on the proper System of Defence, and on the Expediency and Efficacy of the proposed Plans for better securing Our Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth. Given at Our Court at St. James's, the Thirteenth Day of April 1785, in the Twenty-fifth Year of Our Reign.

UPON the receipt of these instructions, you are to give notice to the Members named in the inclosed list, of the day on which they are to assemble at Portsmouth, and fix the hour and place where they are to meet.

As soon as seven of Our said land Officers, and five of our said sea Officers, are assembled, they are to proceed to business, and to adjourn, from time to time, as they shall see occasion.

You are to appoint some intelligent Officer to act as secretary, who is regularly to enter in a book the proceedings of the Board.

In case of difference of opinion, the reasons for such difference are to be stated, either jointly or separately, and are to be signed by each Member present.

The matters treated of, and the opinion of the Members, are not to be divulged without Our Royal permission.

As the enquiries necessary to be made, to enable the Board to give a well informed opinion on this important subject, must branch out into a variety of matter, We

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have directed that they should be arranged under separate heads; which have been accordingly prepared for this purpose, and are hereunto annexed.—On these the Board are to report their opinions to Us.

Under each head is added a set of more minute and detailed questions and observations. The answers which the Board will give to them, will form the basis of their more general conclusions. These questions, with the answers, as well as these instructions, the separate heads, and the report, are to be entered in a book, containing the proceedings of the Board; which are also to be laid before Us, that We may be able, at any time, to refer to the grounds on which their opinions have been formed.

If any other matter, not contained under those heads or questions, should occur, and appear to the Board to throw more light on this subject, they will add it to their report, with any further observations they may think proper to submit to Our consideration.

The first part of the subject referred to the investigation of the Board is, in general terms, the proper system of defence for Portsmouth and Plymouth; which will naturally lead them to consider, whether a system of Naval Defence alone—a system of Land Defence, from troops alone—or, a system of Naval and Land Defence combined, can be relied on for the protection of the Dock Yards of Portsmouth and Plymouth; or whether Fortifications are necessary: If they are, the second part of the subject referred to this Board; viz. The expediency and efficacy of the proposed plans, will next require their attention.

But before they can agree on any system of defence, it will be necessary for them to agree on the nature and extent of the attack against which it is to be calculated, and on the circumstances to which the kingdom may be reduced by the events of war, when called upon to defend its Dock Yards.

Note.—(Then follow six data, stating circumstances that may prevent the Fleet from affording effectual protection to the Dock Yards, the force of the enemy against which it may be prudent to guard, the number and sort of troops that may be had for the

the defence of these places, and the time it may require to collect the strength of the country from other parts of the kingdom. These six data are omitted, because the matter they contain is not proper to be divulged, and because the Board established two new data in place of the two first, and considerably varied two of the others.)

The Board will vary or add to these data as they shall see occasion.

The heads, and questions under them, will best explain the manner in which the Board is to proceed in applying these data.

We have ordered that such naval assistance as may be wanted, at the Ports, shall be given; and that such engineers and artillery officers as the Board may wish to examine, shall attend them; they will also have the proper plans and surveys laid before them.

It will be necessary for the naval Officers to examine the shores, as well as for the land Officers to study the country, which must undoubtedly take up time; but We hope that the Board will be able to make their Report by the first week in June.

With respect to calculations of expence, or making out plans upon any ideas that may be proposed, the Board will give their directions for this purpose, either to the Engineer on the spot, or to the Committee of Engineers at the Tower, as they shall see occasion; and their Reports are to be entered in the proceedings of the Board.

As accurate estimates can only be made on works which in every particular are settled, and upon detailed drawings and sections of them, such computations as may give a general idea of the probable amount of the expence will be sufficient.

G. R.

EXTRACTS from the Report made to his Majesty by the Board of Land and Sea Officers, appointed by his Majesty to investigate and report on the proper System of Defence, and on the Expediency and Efficacy of the proposed Plans for better securing the Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth, bearing Date the 24th Day of June 1785.

M E M B E R S Present.

At PORTSMOUTH.

G. D. of Richmond, Pres.
V. Ad. Barrington,
Lt. G. Sir Guy Carleton,
Lt. G. Sir Will. Howe,
Lt. G. L. Geo. Lennox,
Lt. G. Burgoyne,
Lt. G. Earl Percy,
Lt. G. Earl Cornwallis,
Lt. G. Sir David Lindsay,
Lt. G. Sir Charles Grey,
Major G. Pattison,
Major G. Cleaveland,
Rear Ad. Lord Hood,
Major G. Bramham,
Major G. Green,
Major G. Roy,
Major G. Garth,
Capt. Hotham,
Capt. Sir John Jarvis,
Capt. Bowyer,
Capt. Sir A. Hammond,
Capt. James Luttrell.

At PLYMOUTH.

G. D. of Richmond, Pres.
V. Ad. Barrington,
Lt. G. Sir Guy Carleton,
Lt. G. Sir Will. Howe,
Lt. G. Earl Cornwallis,
Lt. G. Sir David Lindsay,
Vice Ad. Millbank,
Lt. G. Sir Charles Grey,
Major G. Pattison,
Major G. Cleaveland,
Rear Ad. Graves,
Major G. Bramham,
Major G. Green,
Major G. Roy,
Major G. Garth,
Capt. Hotham,
Capt. Macbride,
Capt. Sir A. Hammond.

REPORT

REPORT of the Board of Land and Sea Officers appointed by Your Majesty to investigate and report on the proper System of Defence, and on the Expediency and Efficacy of the proposed Plans for better securing the Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth.

Having fully taken into our consideration your Majesty's instructions, under your Majesty's signet and sign manual dated the thirteenth day of April 1785, and observing that your Majesty has been graciously pleased to allow us to vary or add to the data contained therein, as we should see occasion, we have availed ourselves of your Majesty's permission so to do; and as, in consequence of such alterations, some heads and questions under them appeared to us to have been already answered in some of the data, we conceived any discussion of them became unnecessary, as will more fully be seen in the minutes of our proceedings herewith laid before your Majesty.

We, therefore, in obedience to your Majesty's commands, beg leave humbly to report to your Majesty, that we have agreed on the following data, as the grounds on which our subsequent opinions have been formed.

First Datum, agreed to unanimously by both Land and Sea Officers at Portsmouth and Plymouth.

That it is perfectly right, necessary, and wise, effectually to provide in time of peace for the security of your Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth, by Fortifications capable of resisting such an attack as an enemy may be able to make upon them during the absence of the fleet, or whilst, from other causes, the fleet may be prevented from affording its protection to the Dock Yards.

Second

Second Datum, agreed to unanimously by both Land and Sea Officers at Portsmouth and Plymouth.

That, as far as is consistent with due considerations of expence, and the probable strength of the land forces, it will be adviseable to provide a defence by fortifications for the Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth, against the chances of the fleet, or such part thereof as might give them protection, being absent for (a certain time named, which is omitted as not being proper to be disclosed).

Note.—The third datum, stating the force of the enemy, against which it may be prudent to guard, the number of embarkations, and the detailed account of ships proper for this purpose, and agreed to unanimously by both land and sea Officers, is omitted, as it cannot be proper that such particulars should be disclosed.

The Fourth Datum, ascertaining the precise number and sort of troops which may reasonably be expected to be had for the defence of Portsmouth and Plymouth, as established by the land Officers, and an observation thereupon, is of a nature not to be disclosed.—The dissent of Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Earl Percy, is in substance contained in their proviso, under another head hereinafter stated at full length; but the particular reasons contained in the dissent of Lieutenant Generals Burgoyne and Earl Percy, are for the same reason omitted.

The Fifth Datum, agreed to unanimously by the land Officers, ascertaining the time that it may require before the strength of the country can be collected from other parts of the kingdom in such force as to defeat such an attempt as is supposed, is for the same reason omitted.

Your Majesty's land Officers at Portsmouth and Plymouth are unanimously of opinion, that such is the situation of the present works, that no finishing, repairs, or improvements, without additional works, can, under the circumstances of the data, afford that degree of security

ty to the Dock Yards, (for the time mentioned in the preceding datum) as may enable your Majesty to employ Your whole fleet, if necessary, on foreign service.

Note.—All the Details relative to the insufficiency of the present Fortifications, unanimously agreed to by the Land Officers, are omitted.

Your Majesty's Land Officers (both at Portsmouth and Plymouth) are unanimously of Opinion, that a system of detached forts is the most proper for the purpose of protecting the Dock Yards.

Your Majesty's Land Officers (both at Portsmouth and Plymouth) are unanimously of opinion, that the system of detached works, as proposed, has, in the extensive situations of Portsmouth and Plymouth, this advantage, that the security to be derived therefrom will not be wholly delayed till the whole of the proposed plan is executed, but an additional degree of Strength will be acquired as the detached works are progressively finished.

Your Majesty's Land Officers (both at Portsmouth and Plymouth) are unanimously of opinion, that the situations (of the several places therein specified) are well chosen for detached works.

Your Majesty's Land Officers (at Portsmouth and Plymouth) are unanimously of opinion, that the new works proposed are well adapted to those situations.

Note.—The detail of the peculiar advantages of these works, unanimously agreed to by the Land Officers, is omitted.

Your Majesty's Land Officers (at Plymouth) are unanimously of opinion, that the distance of the situation proposed, in lieu of Merrifield, from the Dock, appears too great for the circumstances of the Data; and would, if fortified, require a greater Garrison and greater expence, and would not afford the same security to the Dock Yard

Yard as Merrifield, and therefore the Land Officers must give the preference to Merrifield.

Your Majesty's Land Officers (at Portsmouth) are unanimously of opinion, that the proposed finishing for works already begun; the improvements to old ones; and the plan for re-building South Sea Castle, will, together with the new works proposed, give a reasonable degree of security for your Majesty's Dock Yard at Portsmouth for the time and under the circumstances of the data, with a garrison of the numbers before specified (regulars and militia) which the Land Officers are of opinion is sufficient for its defence; whereas the present works, even when repaired, finished, and improved, would require a larger force for their defence, with which they would still be ineffectual for the purpose of securing this Dock Yard.

Your Majesty's Land Officers (at Plymouth) are unanimously of opinion, that a garrison (of the numbers before specified, regulars and Militia) appears sufficient if the proposed new works and repair of old ones are executed; and that for the present works, even when repaired, a much larger garrison would be ineffectual for the purpose of securing this Dock Yard.

Your Majesty's Land Officers having taking into consideration the whole situation of Plymouth, are unanimously of opinion, that the proposed new works, in addition to the old ones, when properly repaired, as suggested in our proceedings (with a garrison of the numbers before specified, regulars and militia) will give a reasonable degree of security for your Majesty's Dock Yard at Plymouth for the time, and under the circumstances of the data.

Your Majesty's Land Officers, as far as they were respectively concerned at Portsmouth or Plymouth, do report to the Committee of Engineers at the Tower, which they have unanimously agreed to adopt, it appears, that the expence of the works proposed for securing your Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth, will be as follows:

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prosperi*

Note.—This paper has been already delivered to the House.

Your Majesty's instructions, under the 23d head, having required, what improvements or alterations, or what other system of defence, the Board would suggest, the unanimous opinion of your Majesty's Sea Officers is, that (a certain number therein specified) of gun boats at Portsmouth and Plymouth, will form a great arm of defence against an invading enemy.

And Your Majesty's Land Officers entirely concur in this opinion with the Sea Officers, considering these gun-boats as a great improvement in the defence of these places.

Your Majesty's Land and Sea Officers beg leave to recommend a set of signals to be established on the projecting head lands (of certain parts of the coasts therein specified) with intelligent mariners to make them, as of essential advantage in conveying early intelligence of the approach of an enemy, and for the protection of commerce.

Your Majesty's Land and Sea Officers unanimously recommend (an improvement in the supply of fresh water at Plymouth, if to be had at a reasonable expence.)

The Board has no other improvement, or other system of defence, to suggest to your Majesty.

Lastly, Your Majesty's Land and Sea Officers humbly beg leave to observe, that they make this report to your Majesty, in full confidence, that the providing an additional security to the Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth is in no respect inconsistent with the necessary exertions for the support of the Navy; which they consider as the first object of attention for the safety and prosperity of the kingdom.

Signed

Richmond, Lennox, and Aubigny,
Sam Barrington,
Guy Carleton,

Will.

Will. Howe,
 Geo. H. Lennox,
 John Burgoyne,
 Percy,
 Cornwallis,
 David Lindsay,
 Mark Millbanke,
 Charles Grey,
 James Pattison,
 Sam. Cleaveland,
 Tho. Graves,
 Hood,
 James Bramham,
 William Green,
 William Roy,
 Geo. Garth,
 William Hotham,
 John Macbride,
 John Jarvis,
 Geo. Bowyer,
 And. Snape Hammond,
 James Luttrell.

Captain Macbride entered the following objection to the third datum, on the subject of the enemy's force against which the Board thought it necessary to provide.

I object to this datum, because it is founded upon a calculation of a large imaginary force. My idea of a descent goes only to the probability of an armament that may possibly consist of (a certain force which he specifies) which I think sufficient to provide against.

To the question, What improvements or alterations, or what other system of defence, the board would suggest?

Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne, and Earl Percy, Vice Admiral Millbanke, and Major General Green, stated, that they had none to suggest under the circumstances of the data.

Real Admiral Graves stated, that he had none to suggest under the excess of the data.

Vice

Vice Admiral Barrington, Rear Admiral Lord Hood Captains Hotham, Bowyer, Sir Andrew Snape Hammond and the Hon. James Luttrell, stated, that they thought it more properly belonged to the Land Officers of this Board, than to them, as the minutes of their proceedings will shew, to enter into any system of defence or fortifications, except such parts as are intended for a defence against ships of war, and the proposals they have offered for gun-boats.

Captain Macbride stated, that he had no further improvements to suggest; but entered his objections to the proposed system of defence.

Note.—Captain Macbride's objections are omitted, because they contain detailed descriptions of the coast-roadsteads, currents, tides, and bottoms, and anchorage, by no means proper to be divulged. Captain Macbride concludes his objections with these words:

I am therefore of opinion that no new works are at present necessary to be erected at Plymouth.

Signed

J. Macbride.

On the Board having declared it to be their unanimous opinion, that no Member is precluded, by the data agreed to by the Board, from suggesting any other system of defence, on those or any other data, for the consideration of the Board, in answer to the question contained in the 23d Head under his Majesty's instructions;

The following Proviso was added:

But we do not think ourselves required, as individuals, by his Majesty's Instructions, or any questions under them, to produce any other system, or other data.

Signed

S. Barrington,

J. Burgoyne,

Percy,

M. Milbanke,

M. Millbanke,
 Tho. Graves,
 Will. Green,
 Will. Hotham,
 J. Jarvis,
 Geo. Bowyer.

Rear Admiral Graves, in assenting to the article of the Report expressing the full confidence of the Board, that the providing an additional security to the Dock Yard at Plymouth is in no respect inconsistent with the necessary support of the Navy; to avoid being misunderstood, desired to explain himself by the following proviso:

I perfectly agree with the rest of the Board, as to the importance of the Royal Navy towards the safety and prosperity of this maritime and insular kingdom; but would not have it implied, that I think any new system of additional land fortifications for the security of Plymouth necessary.

Signed

T. Graves.

Lieutenant Generals Burgoyne and Earl Percy, Vice Admiral Millbanke, Rear Admiral Graves, and Captain Sir John Jarvis, on signing the Report, beg leave to represent to your Majesty as follows:

That our proceedings have been founded upon the supposition of the whole fleet being absent (for a certain time) as mentioned in the second datum, and therefore that the enemy may bring over an army (of the force mentioned in the third datum) with an artillery proportionate to an attack on Portsmouth or Plymouth, having (a certain time) to act in, uninterrupted by the British fleet, as mentioned in the third datum: The bare possibility of such an event we do not pretend to deny; but how far it is probable that the whole British fleet maybe sent on any service requiring so long an absence, at a time when the enemy is prepared to invade this country with (a force as that mentioned in the third datum) we must humbly leave to your Majesty's superior wisdom; and therefore, whether it is necessary, in consequence of such a supposition,

to

to erect works of so expensive a nature as those proposed, and which require such garrisons to defend them.

Signed

J. Burgoyne,
Percy
M. Millbanke,
T. Graves,
J. Jarvis.

Lieutenant Generals Burgoyne and Earl Percy, on agreeing to the erecting of new works, and to the system of detached forts being the most proper for the preservation of the Dock Yard at Portsmouth, entered the following proviso :

We approve of the system of detached works, and we agree to the above, under the circumstances settled in the data, provided the expence to be incurred shall not exceed such sums as the State can afford to grant for these purposes, and that the number of troops supposed to be allotted by the fourth datum, can be spared for the defence of Portsmouth, consistently with the general defence of the kingdom.

Signed

J. Burgoyne,
Percy.

To which proviso the rest of the Land Officers, members of this Board, think it their duty to add :

That we the underwritten humbly desire that it may be understood by your Majesty, that we never entertained an idea that any expence to be incurred should exceed such sums as the State could afford for these purposes, as we apprehend was fully stated in our second datum ; or that we meant to recommend works requiring a greater number of troops to defend than could be spared for the defence of Portsmouth, consistently with the general defence of the kingdom.

On the contrary, the works we recommend appear to us to be calculated upon the most economical principles, and to require the smallest number of troops possible to answer the purpose of effectually securing your Majesty's Dock Yards at Portsmouth and Plymouth. We conceive that

that such numbers can be spared for this purpose; we consider such protection to be an essential object for the safety of the State, and intimately connected with the general defence of the kingdom; but we do not consider it to be our province minutely to enter into a consideration of the abilities of the State to provide the necessary supplies for this purpose.

Signed

Richmond, Lennox, and Aubigny,
Guy Carleton,
Will. Howe,
Geo. H. Lennox,
Cornwallis,
David Lindsay,
Charles Grey,
James Patitson,
Sam. Cleaveland,
James Bramham,
William Green,
William Roy,
George Garth.

RICHMOND, &c.
President of the
Board of Land
and Sea Officers,
&c.

AN

COPY of an ESTIMATE of the expence of fortifying His Majesty's Dock Yards at *Portsmouth* and *Plymouth*, by the committee of Engineers at the *Tower*; annexed to the report made to his Majesty by the Board of Land and Sea Officers, appointed, under his Majesty's Royal authority, to investigate and report to his Majesty on the proper system of defence, and on the expediency and efficacy of the proposed plans for better securing his Majesty's Dock Yards at *Portsmouth* and *Plymouth*

For erecting new
works on *Portsea Island*

£. s. d.

For six brick towers
on the beach, be-
tween *Cumberland*
Fort and *South Sea*
Castle

3,300 — —

For a pentagonal
Fort at *Hilsea Lines*

95,381 10 —

For two Redoubts at
Hilsea lines

2,640 — —

Total for new works
on *Portsea Islands*.

£. 101,321 10

For the purchase of
land on *Portsea*
Island.

For the supposed va-
lue of land to be
purchase d for the
fort at *Hilsea Lines*.

2,600 — —

Total for new works, in-
cluding the purchase
of land, on *Port-*
sea Island.

£. 103,921 10 —

For

For erecting new
works on the *Gosport*
Side.

For a Pentagonal fort
proposed at *Stokes*
Bay

For a Pentagonal
Fort proposed near
Frater Lake

Total for new works
on the *Gosport* Side

For the purchase of
Land on the *Gosport*
Side

For the value of the
Land at *Stokes Bay*
and *Fort Monckton*,
as set by the Jury.

For the supposed value
of land to be pur-
chased for the Fort
near *Frater Lake*.

For the Purchase of
land at *Gosport*.

Total for new works
including the pur-
chase of land at
Portsmouth.

For erecting new
works in the *Ply-*
mouth division.

For the proposed pen-
tagonal fort on the
heights of *Mater*,
including advanced
works

For the proposed pen-
tagonal Fort on
the heights of *Mer-*
field

Total for new works
in the *Plymouth* di-
vision.

135,970 13 11

111,278 11 8

— —

£. 247,249 5 7

11,747 16 7 $\frac{1}{2}$

10,000 — —

— —

£. 21,747 16 7 $\frac{1}{2}$

— —

£. 372,918 12 2 $\frac{1}{2}$

119,588 5 5

101,964

— —

£. 221,552 5 5

For

For the purchase, of
land in the *Plymouth*
division.

For the value of the
land for the Fort
on the Heights of
Maker, as set by the
Jury

13,945 7 6

For the supposed va-
lue of the land for
the fort on the
heights of *Merry-
field*

14,000 — —

Total for the pur-
chase of land in the
Plymouth division.

— —

£. 27,945 7 6

Total for new works
including the pur-
chase of land for
Plymouth

— —

239,497 12 11

For the repair and im-
provement of the
old works on *Port-
sea Island*.

For *Cumberland Fort*,
with the additional
alterations now pro-
posed

3,444

17

For the repair and im-
provement of *Lump-
Battery*

1,971 19 7

For Do — of *Eastney
Battery*

3,232 —

7

For the repair of the
old works round
the town of *Port-
smouth*.

10,715 13 9

0

For

For completing the
works round *Port-*
mouth Common on
the reduced plan.

26,929 17 0 $\frac{1}{4}$

For taking down
South Sea Castle,
and building a
Square Redoubt in
lieu thereof

10,080 8 0

Total for Old Works
on *Portsea Island* -

£. 87,379 15 6 $\frac{1}{2}$

For the Repair and
Improvement of the
Old Works on the
Gosport Side.

For the Repairs and
Additions to *Block-*
house Fort -

1,054 19 0

For completing *Fort*
Monckton -

32,457 12 3 $\frac{1}{2}$

For completing the
Lines at *Wevill* and
Priddy's Hard -

8,248 3 0

Total for Old Works
on the *Gosport Side*

£. 41,760 14 3 $\frac{1}{2}$

Total for Old Works
at *Portsmouth* -

£. 129,140 9 10 $\frac{1}{2}$

For the Repair and
Improvement of the
Old Works at *Ply-*
mouth.

For revetting the *North*
Gloster and Second
Devon Redoubts -

5,748 12 0

For

(99)

or repairing the Ci-
tadel -

1,955 3 11 1/2

For repairing the Bat-
tery on the *Hant* -

3 9 10

For do. *Eastern King*

4 8 4

For do. *Western King*

4 3 0

For do. *Passage Point*

2 8 0

For repairing the
Works on *St. Ni-
cholas Island* -

110 0 7

For repairing the
Lines round *Ply-
mouth Dock Town*

694 1 9

Total for Old Works
at *Plymouth* -

1,852 7 5 1/2

RICHMOND, Va.

GENERAL

Of
V
of
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Lord A
R. P.
James
John A
H. Ad
T. Au
J. Au
Gener

R. W.
F. Ba
J. Ba
John
G. B
G. B
J. Bl
H. B
Ch. T
C. B
G. B
F. B
J. H
W. B
R. B
H. B

Sir I
Sir C
W.
Jen
R. C
J. B
J. B
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J. A

GENERAL ABSTRACT of the whole Expenses incurred by the Navy in the Construction and Repair of the Dock-Yards and Works, from the 1st of January 1790 to the 31st of December 1800.

Particulars	On the River Thames		On the Coast		On the Land	
	£	s	£	s	£	s
Expenses to fortify the Dock-Yard at Portsmouth	149,140	9	10	148,570	15	10
Total Expenses to fortify the Dock-Yard at Portsmouth	8,625	12	6	141,584	5	10
General Total of Expense	137,665	17	4	570,154	1	0
At Richmond, &c.	70,632	0	0			
Consequently the Total Amount of Old Works will then be	108,037	17	4			

RICHMOND, &c.

AN ALPHABETICAL LIST

Of ONE HUNDRED and SIXTY-NINE MEMBERS of the HOUSE of COMMONS, who Voted for the DUKE of RICHMOND's Plan of Defending the Forts and Dock Yards of this Kingdom by Military Fortifications; when the Speaker gave the casting Vote against the Measure.

A.
Lord Apsey
R. P. Arden
James Amyatt
John Aldridge
H. Addington
T. Aubery
J. Aubery
General Adams

B.
R. W. Boodle
F. Baring
J. Baring
John Beller
G. Birkley
G. Bowyer
J. Blackburne
H. Bampfey
Ch. Borne
C. Brandling
G. B. B. B. B.
P. B. B. B.
J. H. Brown
W. B. B. B.
T. B. B. B.
H. B. B. B.
— Brodie

C.
Sir R. Cotton
Sir G. Collier
W. Chayner
Hon. W. Cornwallis
R. Colt
John Calvert
R. E. Cawthorne
R. Cragg
F. C. C. C.
— C. C. C.
— A. C. C.

J. Crutchley
Lord Courtown
Lord F. Campbell
J. Campbell
Hay Campbell

D.
H. Duncombe
Wm. Devaynes
E. Darell
Lord Delaval
H. Drummond
Sir E. Daring
J. Dawes
H. Dalrymple
A. Douglas
G. Douglas

E.
Earl of Euston
E. J. Elliot
— Elliot
J. T. Ellis
Col. Egerton
E. Edwick
Sir A. Edmonstone
O. N. Edwards
F.
Sir Adam Ferguson

G.
Marquis of Graham
W. Grenville
J. Grenville
A. G. G. G.
James Gordon
R. G. G.
Col. Goldworthy
H.
J. J. Hamilton
Sir J. Hankey

Lord Hinchinbrook
Sir H. Houghton
Lord Hood
Sir R. Hill
B. Hammett
A. Hood
G. Hardinge
J. Hunter
J. W. Hennessy
Sir J. Henderson
P. Hume

J.
C. Jenkinson
T. Johnes
P. Johnstone
K.
Sir L. Kenyon
T. Kempe
John Kynaston
Sir C. Kent

L.
E. Lovell
Sir W. Lewis
Sir James Langham
Sir E. Littleton
Lord G. Ligonier
James Luttrell
C. Lefevre

M.
Lord Mahon
James Macpherson
W. Macnamara
R. Macbride
H. W. Maclean
R. S. Miles
Thomas Malet
— Malet
Sir C. Middleton

W. Mainwaring
Lord Mulgrave
Lord Muncaster
W. Middleton
P. Le Mefurier
J. Macnamara
P. Maccall
G. Medley
R. Manners
Sir W. Mansell
D. Murray
J. Moore
William Macdowall
J. Murray
Lord Mornington
Sir J. Mawby

N.
Edward Norton
Ed. Nugent
R. Neville

O.
G. Osbaldiston

P.
P. P. Powney
W. Pitt
H. Phipps
W. M. Pitt
H. Phipps
Sir J. Parnham
William Parnham
E. Phillips
J. J. Pratt
C. Phipps
D. Parnham
R. Parn
R. Parnham
R.
C. W. B. Rouse

Sir T. Rich
George Roft
D. Ryder
E. Rufforth
Sir C. F. Ratcliffe
S.
W. Selwyn
Sir James Stuart Dent
J. Scott
Sir R. Smith
J. Smith
Sir C. Sykes
J. Sutton
G. Selwyn
S. Smith

T.
Lord Tyrconnel
S. Thornton
R. Thornton
H. Thornton

V.
J. C. Villiers

W.
W. Waller
W. Wilkes
D. Wilkes
B. Wilkes
J. Wilkes
W. Wilkes
W. Wilkes
S. Wilkes
N. W. Wilkes
J. Wilkes

Y.
P. York
W. Young
Sir R. Young

THOMAS STEELE,
M. A. TAYLOR, } PRINTED.

Of One Hundred
Yards for the
King's
the calling

[illegible]

ONE HUNDRED and SEVENTY MEMBERS of the HOUSE of COMMONS, who
 talized their Names by Voting against the DUKE of RICHMOND's Plan
 of Fortifications.

C. W. CORNWALL, Speaker.

A.
 F. Annesley
 Sir J. St. Aubyn
 Jas. Adams
 W. Amcotts
 W. P. Accourt
 W. Adam
 J. Anstruther
 B.
 R. Burton
 Sir F. Basset
 W. A. Boscawen
 J. P. Balford
 Sir C. Bampfild
 F. J. Browne
 H. Banks
 J. Bodd juns.
 J. Bullock
 J. Burghley
 H. Bridgeman
 R. Bonyon
 L. E. Bostwick
 Sir H. Bridgeman
 E. Boscawen
 W. H. Bourne
 C.
 W. Colbourn
 J. Crew
 J. Call
 Edward Coke
 J. Chavelland
 Sir G. Cooper
 Sir W. Codrington
 P. A. Curzon
 J. Cotes
 H. Cecil
 D. P. Coke
 J. Courtney

P. Crispin
 H. Calvert
 H. S. Conway
 W. Conway
 F. Charteris
 Sir W. Cunningham
 D.
 W. Drake juns.
 J. Dawkins
 Hon. C. Damer
 Lord Duncannon
 P. Dimes
 W. Dickinson
 C. Dampier
 Sir Thos. Dando
 E.
 Hon. — Edgcombe
 Sir J. Eden
 W. Ewer
 W. Ellis
 Sir J. Erskine
 W. Evelyn
 F.
 B. Fitzpatrick
 T. Fane
 H. Fane
 H. Fane
 P. Francis
 Sir J. Frederick
 Chas. Jas. Fox
 J. Fox
 T. F. Fox
 E. Foley
 G.
 W. Gifford
 J. Gifford
 E. Gifford
 C. Gifford

J. L. Gower
 A. Gossard
 H.
 J. Hunt
 D. Howell
 A. Holbourn
 J. Hunt
 F. Huntwood
 W. Hunt
 I.
 Lord Inchiquin
 J. C. Ince
 Sir J. Ince
 G. Jennings
 E.
 R. Kitchin
 R. P. Knight
 L.
 Sir W. Lambton
 J. Lambton
 W. Lawrence
 B. Lambton
 L. Lambton
 J. Lambton
 D. Lambton
 E. Lambton
 M. Lambton
 R. Lambton
 J. Lambton
 Lord Lambton
 M.
 Sir W. Lambton
 J. Lambton
 — Mitford
 Sir J. Morland
 E. Morland
 Jas. Morland

Sir J. Miller
 Lord Middleton
 E. Morant
 C. Morham
 F. Morham
 C. Morham
 A. Morham
 E. Morham
 Sir H. Mackworth
 N.
 N. Newham
 D. North
 W. Norton
 J. Nichols
 C. Norton
 G. A. North
 J. North
 R. Nicholas
 O.
 J. Ord
 W. M. Owen
 P.
 Sir P. Parker
 W. Prad
 Sir R. Palk
 J. Palling
 W. Plomer
 Lord Penrhyn
 F. Page
 J. Pellingham
 H. Pelham
 C. Penruddock
 J. G. Phillips
 R.
 P. Raffley
 J. Rolle
 Sir W. Rawlinson
 C. Robinson

J. Roake
 Sir M. W. Ridley
 Sir J. Roake
 S.
 Earl of Surrey
 C. Stewart
 T. Scott
 W. C. Skipton
 J. Stanley
 J. Sawbridge
 Lord Chas. Spencer
 Lord R. Spencer
 R. B. Sheridan
 S. Salt
 J. Stewart
 R. Shaw
 T.
 J. Tappin
 R. Thistlewayn
 C. Taylor
 Sir J. Threlkeld
 G. W. Thomas
 J. Townsend
 V.
 G. Vane
 R. Vane
 General Vaughan
 Sir G. W. Vane
 W.
 W. Wrightson
 W. Widdell
 J. Webb
 J. Walsby
 H. Walsby
 W. Walsby
 J. Walsby
 Lord Walsby
 Sir W. W. Wynne

LORD MAYLAND,
 CAPTAIN MACBRIDE, } TELLERS.

On Account of the long continuance of the Debate, Sir George Howard and many other Gentlemen,
 proved themselves decidedly against the question by pairing off.

[The List may be had Separate, Price Two-pence.]